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Weisbord: Trust Term Extension

TRUST TERM EXTENSION
Reid Kress Weisbord*
Abstract
Over the last thirty years, most jurisdictions in the United States have
repealed or abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities, which prohibits
perpetual donor control over property. This, in turn, has led estate planning
practitioners to consider whether a trust created to comply with the Rule
could, after the Rule’s repeal, be extended in perpetuity to provide for
future generations of the settlor’s descendants upon petition of the trustee.
Trust term extension in this context implicates fundamental questions
about the purpose of a trust: For whose benefit—the beneficiaries’, the
settlor’s, or the trustee/fiduciary’s—does the trust exist? This Article
argues that the purpose of a private donative trust is to benefit beneficiaries
selected by the settlor and that perpetual trust conversions are inconsistent
with this purpose because they impair the interests of existing beneficiaries
by converting remainder interests into less valuable life interests. Financial
institutions serving as corporate fiduciaries, however, would further their
own pecuniary interests by seeking perpetual trust conversions that extend
the duration of commissions charged to the trust for performing
administrative and managerial services. The possibility of trust term
extension, therefore, not only implicates problems associated with dead
hand control of property, but it also creates the potential for tension
between corporate trustees and beneficiaries selected by the settlor. This
Article, the first to examine the topic of trust term extension critically,
argues that courts should reject trustee-proposed perpetual trust
conversions for at least two reasons. First, modification should not be
granted for the benefit of the fiduciary, particularly at a beneficiary’s
expense. Second, an important recent trend in trust law has sought to favor
the rights of living beneficiaries over a settlor’s right to exercise dead hand
control over trust property, so evidence of what the settlor would have
wanted but for the Rule should therefore not override vested beneficial
interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Trust law and the broader legal framework governing wealth transfers
in the United States have been pulled in opposing directions. On one hand,
dead hand control has tightened its grip. Donor-friendly reforms include a
widespread retreat from the Rule Against Perpetuities that expands the
permissible duration of donor control over private gratuitous transfers and
significant federal wealth transfer tax reforms that sweeten the donor’s
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financial incentives to exercise that control. On the other hand, a different
current of trust law reform has marked a modest shift in the balance of
power away from the donor’s dead hand in favor of living beneficiaries.
Donor-constraining reforms include exceptions to spendthrift trust
protections, a lowering of the threshold for trustee removal, and an
expansion of doctrines permitting trust modification and termination.
These divergent trends reflect tension in trust law between the settlor’s
right to exercise control over gifted property and the interests of
beneficiaries for whose benefit the trust was created.1 This Article
examines an important aspect of this tension—trust term extension. That
is, could the duration of a trust settled in a jurisdiction governed by the
Rule Against Perpetuities be extended indefinitely after the jurisdiction’s
repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities?2 If so, the dead hand would seem
to prevail over existing beneficiaries who would take in fee simple had the
trust’s duration remained within the term contemplated by the original trust
instrument. Would trust term extension, particularly when proposed by the
trustee, be consistent with the underlying intent-fulfilling purposes of
private donative trusts and, if so, would it actually serve to further the
settlor’s interest in the trust? Or might this practice add another tension to
the mix—a new source of conflict between fiduciaries and beneficiaries?
This Article envisions a plausible situation in which an irrevocable trust
is settled in a jurisdiction governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities and
the settlor, in preliminary discussions with estate planning counsel, states
that her primary objective is to convey property in trust for the benefit of
several generations of descendants, both born and unborn. Counsel,
however, advises the settlor that the Rule Against Perpetuities would
invalidate the interests of distant unborn descendants because, at the time
of the trust’s creation, those interests would not be certain to vest or fail to
vest within the governing perpetuities period. As a result, following the
advice of counsel, the settlor executes a trust instrument complying with
the Rule: instead of creating beneficial interests spanning several future
1. For an example of this tension, compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2010) (“A trust and its
terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”), with id. § 412(a) (authorizing modification of a
trust by court order under certain circumstances, but noting “[t]o the extent practicable, the
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention”). For scholarship on
the debate about whether to allow or contain dead hand control, compare Gregory S. Alexander,
The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257–64
(1985) (discussing the two basic arguments undergirding objections to dead hand control), with
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–
14 (1992) (discussing traditional justifications for preserving testamentary freedom), and Scott
Andrew Shepard, Which the Deader Hand? A Counter to the American Law Institute’s Proposed
Revival of Dying Perpetuities Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 559 (2012) (criticizing arguments in favor of
reviving the rule against perpetuities and offering alternative solutions to dead hand control).
2. For an overview of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see infra Part I.
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generations of unborn descendants as the settlor would have liked, the
executed trust limits its duration to only two generations below the settlor.
If, after the settlor’s death, the relevant jurisdiction repeals or abrogates its
Rule Against Perpetuities, could the trustee then petition for modification
that would extend the trust’s duration beyond the perpetuities period in
effect on the date of conveyance and add new generations of the settlor’s
descendants as beneficiaries? Could a trust with existing residuary
beneficiaries be converted into a trust of perpetual duration that provides
additional asset protection for incumbent beneficiaries and new income or
remainder interests for the benefit of the settlor’s unborn or later-born
descendants?3
Practitioners have explored the idea of extending a trust’s duration
beyond its original perpetuities period through the use of an estate planning
technique known as “trust decanting.”4 As originally conceived, this
technique allowed the trustee to freshen a stale trust instrument by pouring
all assets, distributable at the trustee’s discretion, into a new trust with the
same beneficiaries while updating obsolete administrative and distributive
terms.5 This Article considers the possibility that trustees may attempt to
take the bolder step of seeking modification to extend a trust’s duration in
perpetuity and create new beneficial interests for descendants of the settlor
that were not named in the original instrument. Citing settlor intent, a
trustee might argue that, had the settlor anticipated the Rule Against
Perpetuities’ repeal, he would have wanted to extend the duration of the
trust’s asset protection features and create beneficial interests for future
unborn generations.

3. Or, alternatively, what if the original trust provided that it should last for as long as the
law would allow?
4. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting, 47 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 166 (2012) (“[E]xercising the authority to decant the trust to extend its
duration beyond the GST rule against perpetuities would not appear to have an adverse effect on a
trust exempt by reason of an allocation of GST exemption.”); William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett
Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 25–26 (2010) (“[I]t may be possible to extend a [zero inclusion ratio]
trust in a manner that would violate the [GST tax] regulatory safe harbors, such as by decanting the
trust property to a perpetual or dynasty trust in a state that has repealed the traditional rule against
perpetuities.”).
5. See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani L. Bennett, Use of Trust Decanting to Extend the Term
of Irrevocable Trusts, EST. PLAN., June 2010, at 1, 3–4 (“Trust decanting generally refers to the
distribution of property from one trust to another trust pursuant to a trustee’s discretionary power to
distribute property to or for the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries. . . . A trustee with discretionary
power to distribute property to or for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries . . . should be able to
give the current beneficiaries . . . [powers of appointment] under the terms of the second trust that
would be the functional equivalent of distributing the property outright to the beneficiaries.”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/2

4

Weisbord: Trust Term Extension

2015]

TRUST TERM EXTENSION

77

Under the doctrine of equitable deviation, courts have the power to
modify original trust terms or terminate a trust where, “because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination
will further the purposes of the trust.”6 The doctrine is commonly
understood to mitigate dead hand control by authorizing relief from settlorimposed restrictions where unanticipated circumstances render compliance
with existing terms inconsistent with the trust’s broader purpose.7 Settlors
cannot opt out of the court’s modification power,8 so the mandatory
6. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a); see also Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom:
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1182 (2013) (noting that the
doctrine of equitable deviation permits a court to “modify an administrative or distributive
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive
provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation
will further the purposes of the trust” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. See Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose
Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 658–59 (2005) (“While [equitable deviation] and
other UTC provisions that provide greater flexibility with respect to the modification and
termination of trusts were designed to be consistent with ‘the principle that the primary objective of
trust law is to carry out the settlor’s intent,’ they lessen the ability of the settlor to control the
enjoyment of trust property by its beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted) (quoting David M. English, The
Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169
(2002))); Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 77
(2008) (stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context, “traditional Anglo-American legal
doctrine gives two basic ways to remove or modify dead hand control of charitable assets: equitable
deviation and cy pres”); Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice to
Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 138 (2007)
(observing, in the semi-analogous context of dead hand control over charitable assets, that
“[t]raditional doctrine gives two basic ways to remove or modify dead hand control of charitable
assets: equitable deviation and cy pres”) ; John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions
in Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 423 (2005)
(stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context, “[t]he doctrines of cy pres and equitable
deviation present a pervasive means by which donees may escape or circumvent the particulars of
naming conditions”); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes
Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 729 (2007) (stating that, in the restricted charitable gift context,
“[c]y pres and equitable deviation are the primary ‘orthodox’ routes to dealing with problematic
donor restrictions”); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1108 (2005) (stating that, in the restricted charitable
gift context, assertion that administrative deviation provides an “avenue[] of legal relief” for a
charity to “to free [donor-]restricted funds for other projects and purposes”); Adam J. Hirsch,
Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2241 (2011) (“[M]eans
whereby lawmakers restrain the dead hand . . . grant[] courts power to modify estate plans over
time.”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 1, at 51 (describing trust modification as a means of obtaining
“relief” from donor-imposed restrictions); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent,
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 607–08 (2005) (describing the expanded formulation of equitable
deviation as among the doctrines that grant “beneficiaries and courts more power to terminate or
modify trusts” notwithstanding restrictions imposed by the settlor).
8. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4).
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availability of modification doctrines limit the dead hand’s power to
control property in the face of unforeseen events and changed
circumstances.9 But legal scholarship has largely overlooked the doctrine’s
countervailing potential to strengthen dead hand control at the cost of
impairing the interests of existing beneficiaries. This Article will consider
that potential in the context of trust term extension, where the settlor’s
failure to anticipate a change in the law—the repeal of the Rule Against
Perpetuities—could be offered by the trustee as a reason to expand the
reach of the settlor’s dead hand.
The factual illustration above implicates a core tension in trust law
between settlors and beneficiaries because the interests of existing
beneficiaries would be impaired to facilitate what would arguably
constitute an expansion of the settlor’s objectives. Examining that tension,
this Article will evaluate the merits of trust term extension within the
larger context of legal reform affecting the scope of dead hand control: the
widespread repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities and, in contrast, recent
signs of a retreat away from dead hand control in certain aspects of trust
law doctrine. So far, the dead hand appears to have won the upper hand.
Although the broader law of trusts has undergone reforms that provide
greater protection for beneficiaries, powerful interests support the
expansion of dead hand control, including financial institutions that could
potentially benefit from additional fees derived from administering
perpetual trusts. This Article argues that modification extending the
duration of a trust beyond the perpetuities period in effect at the time of
conveyance would constitute a misapplication of the doctrine of equitable
deviation, and would be inconsistent with a modern trend in trust law of
providing greater protection for living trust beneficiaries.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the doctrinal ingredients
for trust term extension—a wealth transfer law framework shaped by dead
hand control and the Rule Against Perpetuities. Part II explores practical
considerations that a party, such as the trustee, might weigh in deciding
whether to file a petition to extend the duration of an existing trust. Part III
examines the doctrine of equitable deviation and its potential application to
modify the duration of an irrevocably settled trust. Part IV considers the
issue of trust term extension within the larger context of legal reform
governing dead hand control of property, assesses its potential for misuse
by corporate fiduciaries, and offers recommendations for law reform.

9. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 687 (9th ed.
2013) (explaining that the doctrine of equitable deviation, as a doctrine permitting a court to modify
or terminate a trust, may represent a limit on a settlor’s freedom of disposition “and therefore the
reach of the dead hand”).
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I. DEAD HAND CONTROL AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Although debate about the permissible duration of dead hand control
has stewed for centuries,10 it continues to attract attention from leading
property law scholars and policy makers today.11 Advocates of dead hand
control argue that principles of testamentary freedom vest the donor with
power to dictate the future use of property and that, when exercised, dead
hand control tends to manifest in the form of legitimate “principalpreserving” and “gate-keeping” objectives to protect future distributions—
neither of which have a pernicious effect on society.12 Opponents of dead
hand control argue that: (1) perpetual or long-term dead hand control often
creates inflexible restrictions that fail to account for a change of
circumstances, thereby impairing the usefulness and value of property
subject to the deceased donor’s lingering restrictions;13 (2) on average, the
settlor’s descendants tend to balloon in population with the passage of
time, creating the possibility of tens of thousands of beneficiaries and an
unmanageable administrative task for the trustee;14 and (3) even when
restrictions are sufficiently flexible, as a normative proposition, scholars
have argued that dead hand control should be curtailed because it
exacerbates the unequal distribution of resources in society by
concentrating wealth and creating stasis within the upper class.15
10. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 1, at 17 & n.63 (citing critics of dead hand control,
including Adam Smith, dating back to the seventeenth century).
11. Compare Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts
4–10 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-007, 2013), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1975117 (arguing that, if settlors were to contemplate the sheer
volume of future beneficiaries numbering in the hundreds of thousands, they might not be inclined
to create a perpetual trust), with Shepard, supra note 1, at 605 (arguing that concern over dynastic
wealth is not a problem best addressed by dictating the permissible duration of dead hand control,
but rather by tax policy governing the transfer of wealth).
12. Shepard, supra note 1, at 591 (“[C]ontrol exerted by the modern dead-hand proves mostly
beneficial, or at least neutral.”).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro.
note, at 549 (2010) (noting that “[t]he policy [of the rule against perpetuities] was this: given that
one can, to a limited extent only, foresee the future and the problems it will generate, landowners
should not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the range of reasonable foresight.”
(quoting A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159–60 (1987))).
14. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why? 18–20 (Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-015, 2013), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2326524.
15. For example, Professor Lewis Simes argued:
It is socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living
members and not by the dead. I know of no better statement of that doctrine than
the language of Thomas Jefferson, contained in a letter to James Madison, when
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For centuries, Anglo-American law balanced these concerns through
the imposition of a Rule Against Perpetuities that curtailed dead hand
control by limiting the permissible duration of restrictions governing the
use or enjoyment of property transferred to a private, noncharitable
donee.16 Originating in seventeenth-century England,17 the Rule invalidates
contingent future interests in property that are uncertain to vest (or fail to
vest) “not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.”18 Under the Rule, the interest of a person unborn
or unascertained at the time of conveyance is contingent upon that person
being born or ascertained.19 For property held in trust, the Rule limits the
number of successive generations the settlor may include as beneficiaries
because, at the time of the trust’s creation, remote generations are unborn
or unascertained and, therefore, their interests are not certain to vest within
a life in being plus twenty-one years.20 The Rule has been incorporated
he said: “The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it
then, and what proceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct.”
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955) (footnote omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro. note, at 561
(“[T]he perpetual or near-perpetual trust movement could . . . lead to large concentrations of wealth
within a relatively small number of family dynasties and financial institutions . . . .”); 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.3, at 412–13 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (stating that the main social and
economic objections to direct restraints on alienation are that the restraints “take the property out of
commerce” and tend to “concentrate wealth”); Alexander, supra note 1, at 1258 (“[R]eference to
the dead hand evokes images of aristocracy and wealth inequality based on feudal-like hierarchy.”);
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 87 (1990) (“The inescapable
conclusion is that society has a major stake in all accumulated wealth. Given that stake, society need
not continue to allow decedents nearly unlimited control over the disposition of their property after
death.”); Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 285, 296 (2009) (noting the
“economic” reproach of dead hand control that unrestricted arrangements for the distant future are
“likely to result in an inefficient use of resources brought about by unforeseen contingencies”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2.1, at 4 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed.
1942) (“The system of rules disallowing restraints on alienation and the Rule [A]gainst Perpetuities
are the two modes adopted by the Common Law for forwarding the circulation of property which it
is its policy to promote.”); id. § 4, at 4 (providing that the Rule Against Perpetuities “is the law
limiting the time within which future interests can be created”); Harding, supra note 15, at 296–97.
The limitation contains an exception for “a trust or other donative disposition of property solely for
charitable purposes.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 27.3(2), at 604.
17. Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215,
229 (2011) (“The Rule derives from the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, decided by the Court of Chancery
in 1682.”).
18. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 166 (2d ed. 1906).
19. For a lucid and concise illustration of how the Rule Against Perpetuities limits the
duration of donor control, see Gallanis, supra note 17, at 229–30.
20. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L.
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expressly into the law of trusts, which requires the settlor to select
beneficiaries who can be identified or ascertained “within the period and
terms of the rule against perpetuities.”21 As Professor Ray Madoff
explains, “[t]he theory of the Rule is that a person should be able to impose
restrictions only on people whom he or she knows plus the period of
minority for the next immediate generation.”22
Over the last thirty years, however, most jurisdictions in the United
States abrogated or repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities by statute to
permit perpetual or near-perpetual trusts.23 This Article is the first to
examine critically the implications of repeal for trusts that were created
while the Rule remained in effect. If a state previously prohibited but now
allows for perpetual dead hand control, should that allowance apply to
trusts settled before the Rule’s repeal? If it is known that the settlor would
have wanted a trust to last forever, should the law allow the trustee to
petition for an extension of the trust’s duration in perpetuity? It is
important to consider these questions for several reasons. First, the law of
trusts must address whether the settlor’s freedom of disposition includes
the trustee’s right to seek perpetual extension of an existing trust after the
settlor’s death. Second, jurisdictions that have repealed or abrogated the
Rule Against Perpetuities must consider whether doctrines of trust law
should enable retroactive application of the Rule’s repeal where
retroactivity might not have been intended by the legislature as part of its
repeal legislation. Third, in states where the Rule remains in effect,
legislatures presented with proposals to repeal the Rule should carefully
consider the implications for existing trusts and the conflict of interest
faced by trustees in seeking to extend the duration of a trust on behalf of a
deceased settlor.
II. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO
SEEK TRUST TERM EXTENSION
This Part surveys some of the practical considerations that might affect
a trustee’s decision to seek modification extending the duration of a trust.
Those considerations include: (a) the settlor’s intent and purposes for
REV. 501, 502–03 (2006) [hereinafter Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule].
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44, at 195 (2003) (“A trust is not created, or if created
will not continue, unless the terms of the trust provide a beneficiary who is ascertainable at the time
or who may later become ascertainable within the period and terms of the rule against
perpetuities.”); accord UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2010) (providing that “[a] trust is created only
if . . . the trust has a definite beneficiary” and that “[a] beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can
be ascertained now or in the future, subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities”).
22. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 77 (2010).
23. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
1291, 1294 & n.9 (2013) (noting that the Rule “suddenly fell victim to a frenzy of legislative repeal
after 1986 as state legislatures rushed to authorize perpetual trusts”); see infra Section IV.A.
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creating the trust; (b) retroactive applicability of the state’s repeal of the
Rule Against Perpetuities; (c) transfer tax implications of term extension
and the creation of new beneficiaries; (d) limitations imposed by the
Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer laws; and (e) the trustee’s
potential conflict of interest in postponing the trust’s termination.
A. Settlor’s Intent
The settlor’s intent should be the starting point for any inquiry into the
possibility of trust term extension.24 A party seeking to extend the term of a
trust—in many cases, the trustee—might assert various justifications for
modification based on the settlor’s material purpose for creating the trust:25
Perhaps clear evidence exists to show that the settlor intended to create a
perpetual trust, but she was dissuaded from doing so by counsel’s advice
regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities. Perhaps the settlor was adamant
about protecting trust assets from the beneficiaries’ creditors through the
repose of discretion in the trustee and the restraint on alienation imposed
by a spendthrift provision. Perhaps the settlor created the trust to facilitate
trustee supervision of the beneficiaries’ needs, a purpose inconsistent with
outright distribution of the trust corpus to remainder beneficiaries. Perhaps,
since empirical research suggests that most perpetual trusts are motivated
by tax considerations,26 the settlor wanted to delay the trust’s termination
indefinitely to avoid subjecting property to estate and gift taxes imposed on
transfers by future generations. Perhaps evidence of a settlor’s intent to
create a dynasty trust27 might be found in a “Kennedy Clause,” which
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1, at
276 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is
the donor’s intention.”).
25. This Article does not address a trust providing expressly for as many generations of
descendants as the law allows because such a trust would not have to be modified to provide for
future generations and its enforceability would depend simply on the jurisdiction’s retroactive
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities’ repeal. See infra Section II.B.
26. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 362 (2005); see infra Section
IV.A.
27. Commenting on why settlors might choose to establish a dynasty trust, Professor Joshua
Tate observes:
While most settlors certainly want to pass tax savings down to their descendants,
that is not the only apparent goal: settlors also wish to protect their wealth from
being wasted and to encourage their descendants to be productive members of
society. Moreover, although it may be true that most settlors do not care about
their unborn descendants, some of them might, and those who do probably want
their spendthrift provisions and restrictions on the use of funds to continue
indefinitely.
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practitioners use to maximize a trust’s duration.28 For these reasons and
perhaps others, the idea of using trust decanting to create a perpetual trust
has surfaced among practitioners.29
B. Retroactive Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The legality of extending a trust’s duration beyond the perpetuities
period in effect at the time of conveyance may depend in large part on
whether the trust’s jurisdiction limits retroactive application of the Rule
Against Perpetuities’ repeal. In some states, repeal applies only to property
interests created after the effective date of the repeal statute.30 In those
states, the statutory limitation on retroactive application of repeal would
seem to preclude a court from extending a trust beyond the perpetuities
period because the beneficial interests, however modified, would have
arisen under the old trust created before the repeal statute’s effective date.
But it is also possible that a court could apply common law or statutory
doctrines of “trust decanting” to create a new trust bypassing the effective

Tate, supra note 7, at 620. On the other hand, in states that repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities
before Congress enacted the generation skipping transfer tax (GST tax), see infra Section II.C., the
response by settlors was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic:
Before 1986, three states—Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Idaho—had abolished
the Rule by statute or had never adopted the Rule in the first place, but it appears
that transferors had little desire to take advantage of the absence of a Rule in those
states in order to establish perpetual trusts for their descendants from time to time
living forever.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 554
(2010).
28. A Kennedy Clause is an estate planning technique used to extend the duration of a trust in
jurisdictions governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. For purposes of trust termination under the
Rule Against Perpetuities, a Kennedy Clause adopts an extraneous person, such as the last to die of
all descendants of Joseph P. Kennedy, as the measuring life. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty
Trusts: Sheltering Descendants from Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 419 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Blattmachr et al., supra note 4, at 166 (“[E]xercising the authority to decant the
trust to extend its duration beyond the GST rule against perpetuities would not appear to have an
adverse effect on a trust exempt by reason of an allocation of GST exemption.”); Culp & Mellen,
supra note 4, at 26 (“[I]t may be possible to extend a [zero inclusion ratio] trust in a manner that
would violate the [GST tax] regulatory safe harbors, such as by decanting the trust property to a
perpetual or dynasty trust in a state that has repealed the traditional rule against perpetuities.”); Culp
& Bennett, supra note 5, at 3 (“A trust decanting statute that is coupled with a statutory repeal of
the rule against perpetuities potentially provides a powerful mechanism to extend the term of
irrevocable trusts. . . . [I]t may be possible to extend the life of irrevocable trusts beyond the term
traditionally allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities.”).
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.070 (2014).
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date of the Rule’s repeal.31 In other states, however, repeal of the Rule
applies to all trusts “whenever created.”32 In those states, the effective date
of the repeal statute would not prevent modification extending the trust’s
duration beyond the perpetuities period in effect on the date of conveyance.
C. Transfer Tax Implications
Modification of a trust’s duration or beneficial interests can have
transfer tax consequences, some of which could militate against trust term
extension. At the federal level, excise taxes are imposed on the transfer of
wealth during life (the gift tax),33 at death (the estate tax),34 and
additionally, on wealth transfers skipping one or more generations (the
generation skipping transfer tax, also known as the “GST tax”).35
Modification of existing beneficial interests may be treated for tax
purposes as a fresh transfer that can in turn give rise to adverse tax
treatment for either the property held in trust or the beneficiaries.
The Gift Tax. Adverse gift tax implications can arise when a
modification of trust terms creates beneficial interests for new beneficiaries
at the cost of impairing existing interests of incumbent beneficiaries. The
cost borne by the incumbent beneficiary and the corresponding benefit to
the new beneficiary could be treated as a transfer of property by gift from
the incumbent beneficiary to the new beneficiary, thereby subjecting the
incumbent beneficiary to gift tax liability.36 However, gift tax liability may
be avoidable if the existing beneficiary is not also the trustee seeking
modification and the existing beneficiary objects to the modification.37 The
inquiry would focus on whether the incumbent beneficiary has exercised
sufficient control over the property such that the incumbent beneficiary has
31. See generally Culp & Bennett, supra note 5 (discussing the use of trust decanting to
extend the terms of irrevocable trusts).
32. See, e.g., 76 Del. Laws 101 (2008) (repealing the Rule Against Perpetuities by way of an
amendment to DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 25, § 503, making the amendment effective for all “trusts
whenever created”).
33. I.R.C. § 2501 (2012).
34. Id. § 2001(a).
35. Id. § 2601. For an overview of the GST tax, see infra Section IV.A.
36. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 26.
37. Cf. id. at 26–29 (“[A] trustee’s exercise of a decanting power should not raise gift tax
issues unless either: (1) the trustee exercising the power to decant is a beneficiary; or (2) a
beneficiary’s consent is required to exercise the trustee’s power to decant.” (footnote omitted)). A
court-ordered trust term extension would not appear to trigger the “Delaware Tax Trap,” an arcane
provision of the gift tax governing the exercise of powers of appointment postponing the vesting of
a property interest because the provision applies only to powers of appointment, not modifications
pursuant to a court order. See I.R.C. § 2514(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(b) (2013) (defining “power
of appointment”). For a more detailed explanation of the Delaware Tax Trap, see generally Culp &
Bennett, supra note 5, at 9–10.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/2

12

Weisbord: Trust Term Extension

2015]

TRUST TERM EXTENSION

85

effectively given away his own property interest.38 If the incumbent
beneficiary were also the trustee, then the decision to extend the trust’s
duration would constitute an exercise of control, which in turn, might be
treated as a gift to the new beneficiaries.39 An incumbent beneficiary’s
consent to modification by a third party trustee might also reflect some
exercise of control over the trust interest sufficient to constitute a transfer
of property by gift.40
The Estate Tax. Modification is unlikely to affect the settlor’s estate tax
liability because the inquiry here is confined to an irrevocable trust created
by a deceased settlor.41 Posthumous amendment to an irrevocably settled
trust does not affect the amount of property that has already passed from a
settlor at death so, ordinarily, there would be no need to reopen a finalized
estate tax return in light of this type of modification.42
The GST Tax. Adverse GST tax implications can arise for irrevocable
trusts created on or before September 25, 1985, the effective date of the
GST tax.43 When Congress enacted the GST tax, the Treasury Department
promulgated regulations categorically exempting trusts that became
irrevocable before the GST tax’s effective date.44 A GST tax-exempt trust,
however, loses its exempt status upon judicial modification that: (1) shifts
a beneficial interest to a person occupying a lower generation than the
original beneficiary; or (2) extends “the time for vesting of any beneficial
interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.”45
This rule would be a significant consideration for a party seeking trust term
extension because, under the illustration contemplated above, modification
of the trust would add beneficiaries occupying a lower generation than the
original beneficiaries and extend the time for the vesting of interests.
Distributions from the modified trust would therefore likely be subject to
the GST tax. The first $5.34 million of post-1985 generation-skipping
transfers are subject to a separate exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (as of
38. See Robert B. Smith, Reconsidering the Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds Through the
Lens of Current Estate Planning, 15 VA. TAX REV. 283, 307 n.93 (1995) (“To avoid subjecting the
beneficiary to gift tax with respect to trust property, however, it is necessary to avoid giving the life
beneficiary either a fixed right to any of the trust property or its income and control over the
decision to distribute to any other person any of the trust income or property which is subject to the
beneficiary’s fixed right.” (emphasis added)).
39. Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 27–28.
40. See id. at 28–29.
41. See id. at 26 (noting the limited circumstances under which modification, by way of trust
decanting, would give rise to adverse estate tax consequences).
42. See id. at 26, 29 (“It is possible for a trust decanting or modification to cause a shift of
beneficial interests that is a taxable transfer for gift tax purposes.”).
43. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (2013).
44. Id. (providing that “[t]he provisions of chapter 13”—i.e., the GST tax—“do not apply to
any generation-skipping transfer under a trust . . . that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985”).
45. Id. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D).
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2014),46 but under current regulations, it is unclear whether the settlor’s
unused GST tax exemption amount could be applied to a modified trust.47
Tax consequences for trusts created after the GST tax effective date are
more benign. For example, a trust created after September 25, 1985, could
be entirely or partially exempt from the GST tax if the settlor allocated
some or all of her GST tax exemption amount under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 to
the trust.48 The modification rules governing pre-1985 trusts do not apply
to post-1985 trusts, so a trust containing property exempt under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2631 could likely be modified without adverse GST tax consequences.49
Thus, the trust would be no worse off due to the modification because the
exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 2631 would apply either way.
D. Bankruptcy and Fraudulent Transfer Law
A party petitioning for modification to a trust that would adversely
affect the vested interest of a beneficiary who is insolvent, nearly insolvent,
or bankrupt should proceed with extreme caution. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, the beneficiary’s vested interest in the trust would most likely be the
property of the beneficiary’s bankruptcy estate unless an exception
applies,50 so a bankruptcy trustee will likely object to any attempt to
46. Note the distinction between a GST tax-exempt trust, which is categorically exempt from
the GST tax because it was created before the statute’s effective date, and the GST exemption,
which excludes from the GST tax the first $5.34 million (as of 2014) of generation-skipping
transfers made by the settlor after the statute’s effective date. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2012) (providing
that the GST tax exemption amount is $5 million plus inflation for any decedent dying after 2011);
Frequently
Asked
Questions
on
New
Tax
Rules
for
Executors,
IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Frequently-Asked-Questionson-New-Tax-Rules-for-Executors#24 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“Under current legislation, the
applicable exclusion amount for estates and generation-skipping transfers . . . . for 2014 is
$5,340,000.”).
47. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 22.
48. I.R.C. §§ 2631–32.
49. See Culp & Mellen, supra note 4, at 25–26 & n.159.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case” becomes property of the bankruptcy estate).
Note, however, that “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that
is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable” under the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
§ 541(c)(2); see also Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that under
both applicable federal and state law, the beneficiary’s interest in the net income of a trust would be
property of the bankruptcy estate “unless an exception applies” and that “[o]ne such exception is
described in § 541(c)(2),” which provides that an enforceable restriction on the transfer interest of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in trust is also enforceable under bankruptcy law). Therefore,
pursuant to § 541(c)(2), if a trust restricts the transfer of a debtor-beneficiary’s interest in the
distributions of net income from the trust, and such restriction is enforceable under applicable law,
then the beneficiary’s “interest in the distributions of net income from [the trust] is not property of
[the beneficiary’s] bankruptcy estate.” Wetzel, 649 F.3d at 835; see also Gladwell v. Harline (In re
Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 670 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
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modify the trust in state court as a willful violation of the automatic stay of
proceedings with regard to the property interests of the beneficiary-quadebtor.51 An attempt by the trust’s trustee to further insulate the
beneficiary’s interest in the trust by extending asset protection features,
such as the repose of discretion in the trustee or spendthrift protection,52
may be viewed by the bankruptcy trustee as an attempt to hinder the
creditor’s collection of assets in bankruptcy. Willful violation of the
automatic stay can give rise to punitive damages.53 The bankruptcy trustee
may also seek to set aside transfers of property interests up to two years
before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition if, in conjunction with one of four
statutorily proscribed conditions,54 “the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily . . . received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation.”55 The look-back period is ten
years for certain transfers made by the debtor “with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud.”56 Where the beneficiary-qua-debtor has acted with
intent to defraud or is otherwise unable to explain satisfactorily a loss of
assets, the bankruptcy court may deny the debtor a discharge in
bankruptcy.57 Outside of bankruptcy, a court could set aside a modification
that would diminish or impair the vested interest of an insolvent (or soonto-be-insolvent) beneficiary under state-level fraudulent transfer statutes.58
Thus, to the extent that trust term extension would interfere with pending
or potential creditor claims, the ability to modify the trust may be severely
constrained.
E. The Trustee’s Potential Conflict of Interest
A trustee may have a conflict of interest in seeking to extend the
duration of a trust beyond its natural termination. For example, a trustee
receiving fees or commissions for its service during the life of the trust
would have a financial stake in postponing the trust’s termination
indefinitely because termination of the trust would result in cessation of the
§ 541, includes in the bankruptcy estate essentially all beneficial ownership interests of a debtor
unless the interest contains ‘[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.’” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2))
(alteration in original)).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (stating that an automatic stay precludes “any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate”).
52. For more on spendthrift protection, see infra Subsection IV.B.1.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
54. See id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).
55. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 548(e)(1).
57. Id. § 727(a)(2)–(5).
58. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4–5 (1984).
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trustee’s compensation.59 Of course, pursuit of trust term extension for the
purpose of aggrandizing the trustee’s own personal gain would be a breach
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,60 so a disloyal trustee would most likely
disguise any improper motivation with pretextual legitimate reasons for
seeking trust term extension. This type of conflict of interest is concerning
because corporate trustees have been known to engage in litigation to
protect the trustee’s own fiduciary appointment and compensation, even
where such litigation subjects the trust corpus to costs associated with the
proceeding and fails to further either the beneficiaries’ interests or the
settlor’s material purpose.61
III. TRUST TERM EXTENSION AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
DEVIATION
This Part considers whether equitable deviation could be applied to
extend the duration of a trust beyond the term imposed by the settlor or the
perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance for the purpose of
59. On the other hand, extension of a trust in perpetuity would also expose the trustee to
administrative challenges and potential liability:
Because a trustee acts at peril for mistaken distributions, the trustee must
investigate whether a person who claims to be a beneficiary does in fact qualify. If,
however, a trust were to have thousands or tens of thousands of potential
beneficiaries, centuries removed from the transferor by descent, the task of
ascertaining which persons qualify as beneficiaries would become enormously
complex and expensive.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 558
(2010) (footnote omitted).
60. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2010) (“A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the
interests of the beneficiaries.”).
61. For example, in Davis v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007), the lifetime beneficiary sought removal of a corporate trustee with consent of all qualified
beneficiaries. Id. at 426. The beneficiary sought removal because the newly proposed trustee was
geographically closer to the beneficiaries, was more familiar with the beneficiaries’ financial
planning objectives, and offered a lower fee schedule than the incumbent trustee. Id. at 429.
Opposing its removal as trustee, the bank asserted a specious argument that its appointment by the
settlor was a material purpose of the trust. Id. at 431. The court found the trustee’s assertion lacked
“any evidentiary support” and ordered the trustee’s removal. Id. Importantly, although Davis did
not address whether the trustee could seek reimbursement of its litigation costs from the trust assets,
absent a court order to the contrary, reimbursement is generally permitted. For instance, § 709(a) of
the Uniform Trust Code provides:
A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as
appropriate, for: (1) expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of
the trust; and (2) to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust,
expenses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the trust.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 709(a).
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creating new beneficial interests for future generations of the settlor’s
descendants not named in the original instrument. Section III.A begins with
analysis of the two relevant doctrines: equitable deviation and modification
to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives. Section III.B considers arguments
for and against trust term extension under those doctrines. Section III.C
examines recent case law that applies equitable deviation with potential
implications in the context of trust term extension.
A. Equitable Deviation and Modification to Achieve the Settlor’s Tax
Objectives
The trust law doctrine of equitable deviation permits modification of an
administrative or distributive trust provision where circumstances
unanticipated by the settlor arise and modification will further the trust
purpose. Section 412(a) of the Uniform Trust Code provides:
The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms
of a trust or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances
not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination will
further the purposes of the trust. To the extent practicable, the
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s
probable intention.62
Similarly, § 66 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides:
The court may modify an administrative or distributive
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate
from an administrative or distributive provision, if because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification
or deviation will further the purposes of the trust.63
The rationale underlying the doctrine of equitable deviation is that if the
settlor had been aware of current circumstances, then he would have
implemented his intent by selecting different terms.64 Courts therefore
62. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492 (2003).
64. The comments to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains the doctrine’s deference to
the settlor’s intent:
[A] court, in granting equitable deviation “is permitting the trustee to do not what
the settlor intended to permit . . . but what it thinks the settlor would have
permitted if he had known of or anticipated the circumstances that have happened.
Even though the settlor has expressly forbidden what the court permits to be done,
the theory is that he would not have forbidden it, but on the contrary would have
authorized it if he had known of or anticipated the circumstances. In so doing the
court is not interpreting the terms of the trust but is permitting a deviation from
them in order to carry out the purpose of the trust. If it appears that the settlor did,
however, anticipate the circumstances and clearly provided that the trustee should
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inquire into the settlor’s intent before authorizing modification.65
Both modern formulations of equitable deviation, as articulated in the
Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement above, represent a liberalization
of the doctrine from its common law origins. An older formulation of the
doctrine imposed a higher standard, requiring the petitioner to show that
compliance with the challenged restriction would “defeat or substantially
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.”66 The old
formulation also restricted relief to modification of only an administrative
provision.67 By contrast, under the modern rule, equitable deviation may be
applied where “modification or deviation will further the purposes of the
trust,”68 and the relief may include modification of an administrative or
distributive provision.69 Additionally, the party requesting deviation need
not obtain the beneficiaries’ consent nor prove that circumstances have
changed since the trust’s creation.70
For an illustration of the traditional doctrine, consider the case of
Donnelly v. National Bank of Washington.71 In 1939, the decedent
nevertheless have no power to act in such a way as to prevent the failure of the
trust, it would seem that the court would not be justified in permitting the trustee
so to act, unless the provision is against public policy.”
Id. § 66 cmt. a, at 499 (alteration in original) (quoting 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 167, at 287–88 (4th ed. 1987)).
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Hallum, 691 S.E.2d 848, 848–50 (Ga. 2010) (denying modification
because terminating distributions to beneficiary indicted for aggravated assault and battery would
be inconsistent with the settlor’s intent to provide treatment for the beneficiary); In re Trust D
Created Under the Last Will and Testament of Darby, 234 P.3d 793, 798–800 (Kan. 2010) (denying
modification because increasing distributions to the petitioner beneficiary would be contrary to the
settlor’s intent).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1), at 351 (1959).
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 498 (“The commentary to
Restatement Second, Trusts § 167 . . . and its Illustrations, as well as the distinct weight of what
case authority there is . . . indicate that the rule of ‘equitable deviation’ applies only to
administrative provisions.”).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a)
(2010) (providing that equitable deviation may be applied where “modification or termination will
further the purposes of the trust” (emphasis added)).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1), at 492; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a)
(“The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust.”).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 498 (“[T]he rule of the Section does not
require changed circumstances. It is sufficient that the settlor was unaware of the circumstances in
establishing the terms of the trust.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom
of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 662 (2014) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Implementing Freedom]
(providing that the equitable deviation doctrine is one of two recognized grounds for “judicial
modification or termination of a trust without the settlor’s consent”).
71. 179 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1947). Administrative deviation is rarely invoked to modify a
substantive provision, so it is perhaps arguable that the Donnelly court extended the doctrine of
administrative deviation beyond the context in which it is typically applied.
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executed a will establishing a testamentary trust for his grandson to attend
college or graduate school with a restriction that annual distributions from
the trust would “in no event [continue] beyond December 31, 1945.”72 At
the time of the decedent’s death in 1940, the grandson was enrolled in a
pre-law curriculum at the University of Washington.73 In 1942, the
grandson graduated from college having completed one year of law school
course work but was drafted into the U.S. Marine Corps for service in
World War II.74 Upon discharge from active duty in 1946, the grandson
sought to resume his law school course work and requested further
distributions from the trust.75 The trustees, citing the 1945 termination
date, refused to distribute additional funds.76 The grandson then filed an
action for modification of the trust to postpone termination of the interest
until he had completed law school.77 Applying equitable deviation, the
court granted the requested modification:
Clearly, it was the intention of the settlor that the specified
amount be paid to respondent to permit him to finish his law
course. The time limit on the payments at the time the will
was executed gave to respondent more than enough time to
complete his law school studies. The time was limited to
December 31, 1945, which time limit detracts in no way from
the settlor’s purpose toward his beneficiary. That respondent
would be compelled to leave his studies for a period in excess
of three years to serve in the armed forces of our country was
not foreseen by the settlor, nor was any provision made
therefor [sic] in the trust instrument. It is unthinkable that a
settlor who regarded his grandson as a son would have so
restricted the time on the education payments as to prevent the
boy, because he was summoned from his school to the armed
forces of our country, from completing his education. The
only reasonable conclusion is that the settlor neither foresaw
World War II nor anticipated that respondent would be
required to leave his schooling unfinished and serve for more
than three years in the armed forces of his country.78
Donnelly presents a straightforward, sensible application of equitable
deviation. The settlor’s original intent was to provide support for his
grandson’s education and, perhaps, to encourage his grandson to attain that
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 336.
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education sooner rather than later.79 But the grandson’s compulsory service
in the military necessarily altered the timing of his education, so the
termination provision had the unintended effect of undermining the
settlor’s original intent. Had the settlor anticipated the beneficiary’s
induction into the military, he most likely would have set a later
termination date allowing the beneficiary to complete his studies.80
Although decided under the doctrine’s old formulation that only allowed
administrative modification, Donnelly granted modification to the trust’s
payment instructions and, as such, appears to have anticipated the modern
formulation’s extension of relief to distributive provisions.
An important doctrinal corollary to equitable deviation is a related rule
authorizing modification of a donative instrument to achieve the settlor’s
tax objectives. Section 416 of the Uniform Trust Code provides:
To achieve the settlor’s tax objectives, the court may modify
the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the
settlor’s probable intention. The court may provide that the
modification has retroactive effect.81
Similarly, § 12.2 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers provides:
A donative document may be modified, in a manner that
does not violate the donor’s probable intention, to achieve the
donor’s tax objectives.82
This doctrine allows for modification when tax law governing the trust
has changed subsequent to the conveyance, or where the instrument, as
executed, simply fails to carry out the settlor’s probable intent with regard
to tax objectives.83 Thus, like equitable deviation, this doctrine exists to
implement the settlor’s probable intent.84 And like the modern formulation
of equitable deviation, modification to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives
may include alteration of an administrative or distributive provision.85
79. Id. at 333.
80. Id. at 336.
81. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (2010).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2, at 388
(2003).
83. See id. § 12.2 cmt. e, at 390 (“Although failure to achieve the donor’s tax objectives is
often due to a change in the tax law occurring after the document was executed, this section is not
restricted to that situation.”).
84. See id. § 12.2 cmt. b, at 389 (“The rationale for modifying a donative document is that the
donor would have desired the modification to be made if he or she had realized that the desired tax
objectives would not be achieved.”).
85. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers explains:
[T]he modification necessary to achieve the donor’s tax objectives may require an
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The rule permitting modification to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives
represents a doctrinal offshoot of equitable deviation because, in its most
typical application, the subsequent enactment of a new tax law governing
the trust is treated as an unanticipated circumstance warranting
modification to conform to the settlor’s original intent. Consider, for
example, the representative case, In re Kaskel.86 In that case, the decedent
died in 1968, leaving a will creating two trusts: a marital trust for his
surviving spouse, and a family trust for the income benefit of his wife with
remainder in trust for his children and grandchildren.87 The marital trust
gave the surviving spouse a general power of appointment that, in default
of appointment, poured into the family trust.88 The surviving spouse died
in 1988 without exercising the power of appointment, so under the terms of
the original instrument, the balance of the marital trust would have poured
into the family trust.89 Both trusts became irrevocable before the effective
date of the GST tax in 1985, so they were exempt from the tax on
generation skipping transfers.90 However, the marital trust’s pour-over
provision would have caused the family trust to lose its GST tax-exempt
status.91 The trustees petitioned the court to modify the marital trust in two
respects: first, to create separate trusts for the decedent’s children to avoid
distribution to the family trust; and second, to fund the newly created trusts
in a manner that took advantage of the surviving spouse’s GST exemption
amount of $1 million.92 Observing that the original instrument “resulted in
unforeseen GST tax consequences,” the court granted the requested
modification.93 Extrapolating from the decedent’s use of planning
alteration of beneficial interests. Such an alteration is acceptable so long as it does
not violate the donor’s probable intention. In determining the donor’s probable
intention, the donor’s non-tax as well as tax objectives are to be considered. The
greater the proposed alteration, the more rigorous the court should be in measuring
the requested modification against the donor’s probable intention. One measure of
the donor’s probable intention is the donor’s general dispositive plan. Even if it is
questionable whether the modification would be consistent with the donor’s
general dispositive plan, however, the court can still find that it does not violate
the donor’s probable intention if the detrimentally affected beneficiaries consent to
the proposed modification. Such consent makes it more likely that the donor
would have approved of the modification, whether or not the modification alters
the donor’s general dispositive plan.
Id. § 12.2 cmt. f, at 390.
86. 549 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1989).
87. Id. at 588.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 589.
93. Id. at 588.
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techniques to minimize estate taxes, the court found that one of the
decedent’s overall objectives in creating the trust was to minimize federal
transfer taxes.94 The court concluded: “It is therefore clear that if some
form of GST tax was in place in 1968, [the decedent] would have taken
advantage of any exemption or benefit that was available to him by law.”95
Thus, the doctrine can operate by treating a subsequent enactment of
new tax law governing the trust—in In re Kaskel, the GST tax—as an
unanticipated circumstance justifying modification of the original
instrument to conform to the settlor’s intent.96
B. Arguments For and Against Trust Term Extension Under
the Trust Modification Doctrines
Proponents of trust term extension are likely to assert some of the
following arguments: First, that under the doctrine of equitable deviation,
modification should be granted where the settlor intended to create a
perpetual trust but failed to consider the possibility that the Rule Against
Perpetuities would be repealed or abrogated and this constitutes an
unanticipated circumstance that allows for such modification.97 Because no
aspect of the equitable deviation doctrine expressly precludes adding new
beneficiaries, the doctrine is sufficiently flexible to allow for this type of
modification so long as the result is consistent with the settlor’s probable
intent.
Second, the related doctrine authorizing modification to achieve the
settlor’s tax objectives supports the case for trust term extension by
recognizing that a subsequent change in the law governing the trust can
form the basis for a modification designed to take advantage of the new tax
law. Further, if a settlor’s tax objectives included sheltering the trust
assets from transfer taxation in perpetuity, then extending the duration
of the trust in perpetuity arguably reflects a tax objective rather than
merely a distributive preference. The doctrine permitting modification
to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives does not require a showing of
unanticipated circumstances and, unlike equitable deviation, does not
94. Id. at 590.
95. Id.
96. Courts have also found that case law decided after the original conveyance may constitute
an unanticipated circumstance warranting equitable deviation. See In re Harris Testamentary Trust,
69 P.3d 1109, 1118 (Kan. 2003) (“The holding in Jackson could not have been anticipated by
Harris, and the change furthers the purposes of the Trust. The change granted is consistent with
Harris’ probable and actual intent.”).
97. Or, alternatively, the petitioner might argue that the settlor’s failure to consider the
possibility that another jurisdiction might repeal or abrogate the Rule constitutes an unanticipated
circumstance warranting modification of the trust’s situs and governing law to relocate the trust
within a jurisdiction that has repealed the Rule.
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limit its relief to modification of an administrative or distributive
provision. 98
Third, although a private donative trust must generally identify
ascertainable beneficiaries, a jurisdiction permitting retroactive application
of the Rule’s repeal has, in effect, nullified the trust law requirement of an
ascertainable beneficiary.99 The Uniform Trust Code requires that a trust
have a “definite beneficiary,” but the Code’s requirement incorporates by
reference the Rule Against Perpetuities: “A beneficiary is definite if the
beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future, subject to any
applicable rule against perpetuities.”100 Thus, abrogation or repeal of the
Rule Against Perpetuities would seem to abrogate or repeal the trust law
requirement of an ascertainable beneficiary as well. For example, in a
jurisdiction that has adopted this provision of the Uniform Trust Code and
repealed or abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities, an unborn descendant
of the settlor eligible to take 200 years from the date of conveyance could
be ascertained in the future even if he could not be identified today. If such
a beneficiary would satisfy the trust law requirement of an ascertainable
beneficiary, then the trust should be susceptible to modification that would
render him a permissible beneficiary.
Fourth, the law should not discriminate against a settlor who intended
(explicitly or implicitly) to create a perpetual trust, but by accident of
history, created an irrevocable trust before the governing jurisdiction
repealed its Rule Against Perpetuities. And fifth, a jurisdiction’s repeal of
the Rule Against Perpetuities signifies public policy favoring perpetual
trusts,101 so trust law should follow suit by facilitating the conversion of
existing trusts into perpetual trusts.
Opponents of trust term extension will likely assert the following
counterarguments: First, and perhaps most compellingly, that the
consequences of trust term extension in this context would impair existing
beneficial interests by converting remainders into lifetime interests in order
to add new generations of the settlor’s issue as permissible beneficiaries;
trust term extensions would force residuary beneficiaries who would have
received an outright distribution under the original instrument to accept a
98. The tax objective modification doctrine provides, “[t]o achieve the settlor’s tax
objectives, the court may modify the terms of a trust in a manner that is not contrary to the settlor’s
probable intention. The court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect.” UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 416 (2010).
99. See, e.g., id. § 402, at 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44, at 195 (2003).
100. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402.
101. Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2639 (2011) (noting that “there is a growing trend in the United States of
abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities,” and this abolition tends to “demonstrate a strong public
policy of favoring donative freedom”).
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less valuable lifetime interest under the modified trust.102 Further,
modification impairing the interests of existing beneficiaries runs contrary
to a core function of trust law: to benefit the beneficiaries identified by the
settlor.103 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts takes the position
that “it is appropriate that courts act with particular caution in considering
a modification or deviation that can be expected to diminish the interest(s)
of one or more of the beneficiaries in favor of one or more others.”104
Applying that rationale, courts have declined to grant equitable deviation,
absent unanimous consent, where the proposed modification would
augment the interests of some beneficiaries at the cost of diminishing the
interests of other beneficiaries identified in the trust instrument.105 If
equitable deviation cannot be applied to redistribute or reallocate interests
among existing beneficiaries, then, a fortiori, the doctrine should not be
applied to create new interests for individuals not identified in the trust
instrument at the cost of impairing existing beneficial interests.106
102. Opposition to trust term extension would, perhaps, be less vociferous in cases where no
living beneficiary is divested of a remainder interest. For example, in a trust where the remainder is
to be distributed to A’s children, a trustee might seek to extend the trust’s duration before A has
children. In this situation, no living beneficiary would be divested because the remainder
beneficiaries have yet to come into existence.
103. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (“A trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries.”).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b, at 493–94.
105. See, e.g., Friedman v. Teplis, 492 S.E.2d 885, 887 (Ga. 1997) (denying modification that
would have avoided unforeseen adverse tax consequences where the guardian ad litem appointed to
represent the settlor’s unborn children failed to prove the proposed modification would have
protected the settlor’s children’s beneficial interest); Nobbe v. Nobbe (In re Trust Under the Last
Will and Testament of Nobbe), 831 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (denying equitable
deviation where the proposed modification represented “an attempt to equalize the devises” among
all of the beneficiaries absent language in the trust authorizing redistribution); In re Trust D Created
Under the Last Will and Testament of Darby, 234 P.3d 793, 801 (Kan. 2010) (“We conclude that
funding an increase [for the first generation of beneficiaries] will inherently frustrate [the settlor’s]
intention for this growth, as well as jeopardize—or at least reduce—distributions to the second and
third generation of beneficiaries.”); In re Estate of Branigan, 609 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1992)
(“Under that proposed [modification], the interests of the grandchildren whose fathers were living
at the time of decedent’s death could be affected by making their father’s power of appointment
general with the possibility they could lose their inheritance.”).
106. Two analogous provisions concerning powers of appointment are in accord. The draft of
§ 305(c)(3) of the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act provides, “[u]nless the terms of the
instrument creating the power of appointment manifest a contrary intent, the powerholder of a
nongeneral power may . . . create a nongeneral power in any person to appoint to one or more of the
permissible appointees of the original nongeneral power.” UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT
§ 305(c)(3) (Proposed Draft 2013). Thus, it follows that if the holder of a nongeneral power of
appointment cannot create a second power whose objects exceed the objects of the first power,
then the nongeneral power cannot be exercised in favor of an appointee not identified in the initial
appointment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.14,
at 307 (2010) (“Except to the extent that the donor has manifested a contrary intention, the donee of
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Second, equitable deviation exists to implement the settlor’s intent as it
existed at the time of conveyance.107 While the settlor might have
reconsidered the purpose, duration, and objects of the trust in light of
subsequent changes to the Rule Against Perpetuities if given the
opportunity, equitable deviation does not authorize a court to entertain a
reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent.108 Likewise, evidence of
objectives or intentions the settlor considered prior to conveyance, but
absent from the finally executed instrument, should not form the basis for
modification that would give effect to preliminary considerations that the
settlor ultimately rejected.
Third, modifying a trust to create new beneficial interests for future
generations of the settlor’s descendants undermines the trust law
requirement of a definite, ascertainable beneficiary.109 The requirement that
a trust have ascertainable beneficiaries implicates core functions of trust
law—the placing of responsibility on the trustee to protect the interests of
known beneficiaries and the right of beneficiaries to enforce the duties of
trusteeship.110 Abrogating the ascertainable beneficiary requirement in this
context would appear to have the effect of undermining the duties of
trusteeship while extending the trustee’s compensation. Unborn,
unascertainable beneficiaries require less of the trustee’s attention and are
not likely to sue the current trustee for breach of fiduciary duties, so the
current trustee would be at least partially insulated from both the
obligations and liabilities of trusteeship. Meanwhile, the existence of
unascertainable future beneficiaries would require the trustee’s continued
service after the trust’s original point of termination, so the trustee, if
compensated, would receive fees that would not have accrued under the
original trust. For these reasons and others, perhaps trust law should revise
a nongeneral power is authorized to make an appointment in any form, including one in trust and
one that creates a power of appointment in another, that only benefits permissible appointees of the
power.”).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, at 493 (“The objective is to give effect
to what the settlor’s intent probably would have been had the circumstances in question been
anticipated.”).
108. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 cmt. (“The purpose of the ‘equitable deviation’ authorized by
subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor’s intent but to modify inopportune details to effectuate
better the settlor’s broader purposes.”).
109. See Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule, supra note 20, at 506 n.32 (noting the argument that trusts
might still be invalidated for want of an ascertainable beneficiary in states that have abolished the
Rule Against Perpetuities). A valid trust generally requires a definite beneficiary. See, e.g., UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 402. Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trust for a noncharitable purpose may have
unascertainable beneficiaries, but its duration cannot last for more than twenty-one years. Id. § 409,
at 67–68.
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 46 reporter’s notes cmt. b, at 212 (“The
beneficiaries’ rights to enforce the trust and make the trustees account for their conduct with the
correlative duties of the trustees to the beneficiaries are at the core of the trust.”).
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the ascertainable beneficiary requirement without regard or reference to the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Fourth, applying equitable deviation in this context would present a
significant risk of misinterpreting the settlor’s intent, particularly in cases
where the settlor is deceased or incapacitated.111 This is, in part, because
the petitioner seeking modification has the upper hand in proceedings for
equitable deviation, in which the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the
party opposing modification to prove the settlor anticipated the
circumstance in question.112 Inquiry into the settlor’s intent is also, by
nature, “likely to involve a somewhat subjective process of attempting to
infer the relevant purpose or purposes of a trust from the general tenor of
its provisions and from the nature of the beneficial interests, together with
the family or personal relationships involved in the trust.”113 After the
settlor’s death or incapacitation, evidence of donative intent is often
difficult to ascertain because the settlor is no longer available to testify or
object.114 But as difficult as it may be to posthumously obtain evidence of
111. Cf. Tate, supra note 7, at 623 (arguing that while easy modification and termination of
trusts may give beneficiaries the authority to “act on their superior information,” such modification
and termination may also involve value judgments that may “allow the beneficiaries, at each
generation, to substitute their own values for those of the settlor” (emphasis added)).
112. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains the procedure for a petition for equitable
deviation:
Upon a showing of changed circumstances, or a petitioner’s credible
presentation that relevant circumstances were unknown to the settlor, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the person(s) seeking to show that the circumstances were
anticipated by the settlor during the formulation and execution of the trust. Failure
to provide in the terms of trust for subsequent developments involved in a case
reinforces an inference that the circumstances were not anticipated by the settlor.
Then, upon a finding of unanticipated circumstances, the court must further
determine whether a proposed or contemplated modification or deviation would
tend to advance (or, instead, possibly detract from) the trust purposes. This latter
inquiry is likely to involve a somewhat subjective process of attempting to infer
the relevant purpose or purposes of a trust from the general tenor of its provisions
and from the nature of the beneficial interests, together with the family or personal
relationships involved in the trust. In this process, it is appropriate that courts act
with particular caution in considering a modification or deviation that can be
expected to diminish the interest(s) of one or more of the beneficiaries in favor of
one or more others.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b, at 493–94.
113. Id.
114. Professor Robert Sitkoff has explained this evidentiary problem in the context of
testamentary dispositions made by will:
A will is a peculiar legal instrument, however, in that it does not take effect until
after the testator dies. As a consequence, probate courts follow what has been
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the settlor’s intent, it is likely even more difficult to posthumously obtain
evidence of what the settlor did not intend, particularly in the face of
circumstances unanticipated by the settlor. A subjective inquiry based on
what may often be unreliable, one-sided evidence of the settlor’s intent is
likely to create a dynamic in which the party bearing the lower burden of
persuasion—the petitioner seeking modification—will dominate the
equitable deviation proceeding. A court may not require much evidence at
all to adduce the settlor’s intent to establish a perpetual trust. This, in turn,
suggests that the grant of modification may tend to have the effect of
implementing the petitioner’s objectives rather than the settlor’s probable
intent. Where unanticipated circumstances do not impede the
administration of the original trust instrument executed by the settlor, it
would seem unnecessary to expose the trust or its beneficiaries to the
possibility of modification that would misinterpret the settlor’s intent.
On balance, the arguments against trust term extension would seem to
greatly outweigh those in favor. Although it may be true that the public
policy of some jurisdictions now favors the creation of perpetual trusts, it
does not necessarily follow that such policy would endorse modification of
an existing trust and the resulting impairment of incumbent beneficial
interests. There is no evidence that the drafting committees of the Uniform
Trust Code or the Restatement (Third) of Trusts ever contemplated the
remote possibility that a trust could be amended or extended in perpetuity,
with the effect of adding new beneficiaries to the trust. If they were to
contemplate the question today, however, it is likely they would reject the
idea wholesale. Impairment of existing beneficial interests in this context
would be manifestly inconsistent with provisions of trust law that protect
existing beneficiaries of irrevocably settled trusts. Posthumous inquiry into
the settlor’s intent presents a significant risk of inaccurate factual findings
and the consequences of those inaccuracies could adversely affect existing
beneficiaries. Although the failure to modify a trust to extend its duration
and expand its pool of beneficiaries may also pose a risk of deviating from
the settlor’s probable intent in light of the Rule Against Perpetuities’
repeal, the adverse consequences of that risk would not divest any living
individual of an existing property interest in the trust. The benefits of
implementing the settlor’s probable intent would therefore seem strongly
outweighed by the costs of impairing the beneficiaries’ actual property
interest in the trust.
called a “worst evidence” rule of procedure. The witness who is best able
to . . . clarify the meaning of its terms is dead by the time the court considers such
issues.
Sitkoff, Implementing Freedom, supra note 70, at 647 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
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C. Insights from Case Law
To date, no reported judicial decision has applied, or refused to apply,
equitable deviation to extend the term of a trust on grounds that the settlor
failed to anticipate repeal or abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
This Section will therefore consider two recently reported opinions
addressing trust term extension outside of the perpetuities context, In re
Riddell115 and In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement (In
re Chapman).116 Both cases offer insight into how courts and litigants
might analyze trust term extension within the perpetuities context.
In In re Riddell, husband-and-wife settlors created testamentary trusts
for the lifetime benefit of their only son and daughter-in-law, and upon
their death, for the benefit of the settlors’ two grandchildren with an
outright distribution of principal when the grandchildren reached the age of
thirty-five.117 Both grandchildren turned thirty-five while the son and
daughter-in-law were still alive.118 After the trusts’ creation, the settlors’
granddaughter Nancy was diagnosed with a serious mental illness and
received inpatient treatment at a state hospital.119 The settlor’s son, as
trustee, foresaw the adverse consequences that would arise if Nancy were
to receive an outright distribution of principal and petitioned for equitable
deviation to distribute her interest into a special needs trust:120
[The trustee] argued that a special needs trust is necessary
because, upon distribution, Nancy’s trust funds would either
be seized by the State of Washington to pay her extraordinary
medical bills or Nancy would manage the funds poorly due to
her mental illness and lack of judgment. [The trustee] argued
that the modification would preserve and properly manage
Nancy’s funds for her benefit.121
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the creation of a special
needs trust for this purpose would not violate public policy with regard to
the treatment of property interests of persons receiving public assistance
and granted the requested modification. Further, in regard to the settlors’
intent the court reasoned that:
There is no question that changed circumstances have
intervened to frustrate the settlors’ intent. [The settlors]
115. 157 P.3d 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
116. Chapman v. Chapman (In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust), 953 N.E.2d 573
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
117. In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 889–90.
118. Id. at 890.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
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intended that she have the funds to use as she saw fit. Not
only is Nancy unable to manage the funds or to pass them to
her son, but there is a great likelihood that the funds will be
lost to the State for her medical care. It is clear that the
settlors would have wanted a different result.122
In re Riddell is noteworthy because it applied equitable deviation in a
manner that impaired an existing, vested beneficial interest while, at the
same time, it rendered the modified trust more useful to the beneficiary. By
postponing outright distribution to Nancy, the modification made the trust
corpus less available than under the instruments’ original terms.123 But the
creation of a special needs trust allowed Nancy to retain her beneficial
interest without jeopardizing her eligibility for public assistance.124
Proponents of trust term extension may cite In re Riddell for the
proposition that equitable deviation can be applied to increase the duration
of a trust beyond its natural termination notwithstanding impairment of an
existing, vested beneficial interest. Proponents may also point out the
implications of In re Riddell on remand. The remand proceedings for the
case were not reported, but the trial court could have modified the trust in
one of two ways to comply with the appellate court’s mandate.125 The first
option would have created a special needs trust for the duration of Nancy’s
life and distributed the remainder outright to Nancy’s estate upon her
death. The second option would have created a special needs trust for the
duration of Nancy’s life and distributed the remainder to Nancy’s children
outright upon her death. Significantly, for purposes of the Rule Against
Perpetuities analysis most relevant to this Article, the second option would
have designated a new generation of the settlors’ descendants, their greatgrandchildren, as permissible beneficiaries of the trust.
If the trial court had ordered the latter modification on remand, then the
grant of equitable deviation could have, in theory, enabled the trustee to
take advantage of the State of Washington’s abrogation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. In 2002, Washington abrogated its Rule, with respect to
property interests held in trust, by extending the perpetuities period to 150

122. Id. at 892.
123. Id. at 890–91.
124. The In re Riddell court further noted that, as authorized by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012), “[a] supplemental needs trust is a
trust that is established for the disabled person’s benefit and that is intended to supplement public
benefits without increasing countable assets and resources so as to disqualify the individual from
public benefits.” In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 892.
125. On remand, the trial court was ordered to “reconsider this matter and to order such
equitable deviation as is consistent with the settlors’ intent in light of changed circumstances.” Id. at
893.
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years.126 The amended Rule applies to irrevocable trusts with an effective
date of January 1, 2002, or later,127 and the In re Riddell trusts were
presumably created long before the 2002 statutory enactment.128 Thus,
proponents of trust term extension might cite In re Riddell as support for
the proposition that equitable deviation can be applied to extend the term
of a trust beyond the perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance.
While arguably creative, this interpretation of In re Riddell would strain
credulity because the appellate court’s opinion did not address the
perpetuities aspect of the trust term extension issue, and the remand order
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014) (“No provision of an instrument creating a trust,
including the provisions of any further trust created, and no other disposition of property made
pursuant to exercise of a power of appointment granted in or created through authority under such
instrument is invalid under the rule against perpetuities, or any similar statute or common law,
during the one hundred fifty years following the effective date of the instrument. Thereafter, unless
the trust assets have previously become distributable or vested, the provision or other disposition of
property is deemed to have been rendered invalid under the rule against perpetuities.”). The prior
statutory Rule in Washington provided, in part:
If any provision of an instrument creating a trust, including the provisions
of any further trust created, or any other disposition of property made pursuant
to exercise of a power of appointment granted in or created through authority
under such instrument violates the rule against perpetuities, neither such
provision nor any other provisions of the trust, or such further trust or other
disposition, is thereby rendered invalid during any of the following periods: (1)
The twenty-one years following the effective date of the instrument; (2) The
period measured by any life or lives in being or conceived at the effective date
of the instrument if by the terms of the instrument the trust is to continue for
such life or lives; (3) The period measured by any portion of any life or lives in
being or conceived at the effective date of the instrument if by the terms of the
instrument the trust is to continue for such portion of such life or lives; and (4)
The twenty-one years following the expiration of the periods specified in (2)
and (3) above.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2001) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014)).
127. The amended Rule added a section stating that:
This act applies to any irrevocable trust with an effective date on or after
January 1, 2002. Unless the trust instrument otherwise provides, this act does
not apply to: (1) Any irrevocable trust with an effective date prior to January 1,
2002; or (2) a revocable inter vivos trust or testamentary trust with an effective
date on or after January 1, 2002, if at all times after the date of enactment the
creator of the revocable inter vivos trust or testamentary trust was not
competent to revoke, amend, or modify the instrument.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2001) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2014)).
128. Although the effective dates of the In re Riddell trusts were not disclosed in the court’s
opinion, the case facts imply that a long period of time had elapsed between the trusts’ creation and
the court’s adjudication in 2007. Nancy received “extensive outpatient care” for her illness as early
as 1991. In re Riddell, 157 P.3d at 890.
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did not expressly require a modification that would extend the trust to the
next generation of the settlors’ descendants. Further, since Washington’s
pre-2002 Rule incorporated the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities’ “wait-and-see” approach,129 the modified trust would likely
have complied with the perpetuities period in effect when the trust was
created. The remand proceedings were not reported, and it is entirely
possible—indeed, likely—that the final modification ordered by the trial
court altered the trust without extending the duration beyond the pre-2002
perpetuities period. Thus, opponents of trust term extension would seem to
have the more persuasive reading of In re Riddell with regard to the
perpetuities question.130
Another case that helps illustrate issues related to trust term extension is
In re Chapman. In In re Chapman, husband-and-wife settlors, Howard and
Elizabeth, created an inter vivos irrevocable trust for the benefit of their
son, Stephen, and appointed themselves as trustees.131 The trust provided
that Stephen would receive a distribution on his fifty-fifth birthday.132 On
the date of the trust conveyance, Stephen (likely forty-three years old at the
time) was engaged to his fiancée, Carrie, and they married about one
month later.133 After eleven and a half years of marriage, however, Carrie
filed for divorce.134 Howard and Elizabeth, as trustees, filed a petition for
equitable deviation seeking to postpone the date of distribution until after
the final decree in Stephen’s divorce proceeding.135 Carrie intervened as a
party with a special interest and opposed the modification. She argued that
the distribution should proceed as directed by the original trust instrument
on Stephen’s fifty-fifth birthday and that, upon distribution, the distributed
funds should be treated as marital assets for purposes of the divorce
proceeding.136
129. See, e.g., Keith L. Butler, Note, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule
Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1249 (2000) (“Washington’s waiting
period is set at beneficiaries’ lives-in-being plus twenty-one years. Trust interests that vest before
the end of this perpetuities period are distributed to the beneficiaries, even if there had been some
remote possibility that the interests could have vested later.” (footnote omitted)); see also Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.
aspx?title=Statutory+Rule+Against+Perpetuities (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
130. Although not related to the perpetuities issue, at least one court in another jurisdiction
declined to follow In re Riddell on grounds that state public policy precluded insulating the
beneficial interest of a trust where the beneficiary seeks public assistance. See In re Ruby G. Owen
Trust ex rel. Owen, 418 S.W.3d 421, 423–25 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012).
131. Chapman v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 953 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
132. Id. The initial corpus consisted of stock in a mortgage company founded by Elizabeth’s
father, but the stock was later sold and replaced with other assets. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 575–76.
136. Id. at 576.
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The trustees claimed that the original instrument contained its own
equitable deviation provision, expressly providing for the possibility of
unforeseen circumstances and authorizing modification when necessary.137
The trust provided as follows:
The Settlors recognize that one or both of the following
unforeseeable conditions may arise in the future:
(a) Legislation or court decisions highly detrimental to any
trust created hereunder or to any beneficiary; or
(b) Other events tending to greatly impair the intent and
purposes of the Irrevocable Trust Agreement.
Should either of these conditions occur, reformation or
termination of the trust created hereunder might be desirable.
The Trustee, in the sole judgment and discretion of the
Trustee, may petition the court of competent jurisdiction for a
determination that a condition coming within either of the
foregoing standards has occurred, and that the best interests of
the trust and of the beneficiaries require reformation or
termination of the trust.138
Carrie argued that divorce was not an unanticipated circumstance.139
She then pointed to language in the trust providing for the contingency of a
pending divorce proceeding at the time of Stephen’s death and argued that
no such provision addressed that contingency other than at Stephen’s
death.140 Carrie claimed that the trust’s mention of divorce demonstrated
that the settlors had anticipated the possibility.141
At a hearing on the trustees’ petition to reform the trust, “Howard
testified that the purpose of the Trust was to pass the property that had
been inherited by Elizabeth and accumulated for generations to
Stephen.”142 Crediting Howard’s testimony, the court of appeals noted the
lower court’s findings:
The trial court found that “[t]he intent of the Chapmans as the
Settlors of the trust was to pass the assets received by
Elizabeth Chapman from her parents on to her son, his family
and his issue.” The trial court determined that “the pending
[marital] dissolution . . . is an event tending to greatly impair
the intent and purposes of the [Trust] and that it is in the best
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 579.
See id. at 582.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interest of the [T]rust and the Beneficiary that [the Trust
provisions] be reformed.”143
Applying equitable deviation, the trial court below modified the trust
“so that any interest of Stephen L. Chapman in the Trust shall not vest
prior to six months after the entry of the final dissolution decree dissolving
the marriage of Carrie A. Chapman and Stephen L. Chapman and
disposing of the marital property.”144
Yet the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.145 Setting a high standard
for equitable deviation, the court cited approvingly authorities requiring
“truly unforeseen” circumstances as a necessary condition for
modification.146 Under that standard, the court found equitable deviation
inapplicable because the trust itself contained language anticipating
Stephen’s divorce—the “unforeseen” circumstances offered as grounds for
modification.147 Under the court’s interpretation of the trust, the settlors
foresaw the possibility that Stephen’s marriage might dissolve and
provided for that contingency if Stephen died during the divorce
proceeding but not if he survived it.148 According to the court, that was
enough to demonstrate that the settlors anticipated the possibility of
divorce and, therefore, it was not an unforeseen circumstance to allow for a
modification of the trust.149
Particularly striking here is the court’s refusal to apply equitable
deviation where the settlor himself testified about his intent with regard to
the trust’s purpose and the proposed modification. Unlike testamentary
trust cases where the parties struggle to adduce evidence of a deceased
settlor’s probable intent, In re Chapman involved an inter vivos
irrevocable trust and the trial court record contained evidence of the
settlor’s actual intent.150 But the court did not base its reversal on a
credibility determination of settlor’s testimony regarding the trust’s
purpose.151 Rather, the court ascertained the settlor’s intent and ex ante
143. Id. at 577 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 575, 582.
146. Id. at 581.
147. Id. at 582 (“[I]n Clause 5 the Trust mentions the possibility of a pending dissolution and
directs that Carrie’s contingent interest lapses if she and Stephen are not married or a dissolution is
pending at the time of his death. This illustrates that Trustees, as then-Settlors, anticipated the
possibility of a pending dissolution at the time of Stephen’s death.”).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 576.
151. Id. at 583 n.6 (“Because we find determinative our holding concerning the requirement
that events be ‘unforeseen,’ and the trial court’s decision to the contrary requires reversal, we do not
reach the trial court’s findings and conclusions concerning the Trust’s purpose and whether the
modification was in Stephen’s best interests.”).
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consideration of Stephen’s potential divorce from the four corners of the
original instrument.152
At trial, Howard, one of the settlors, testified that “[t]he only
way . . . that [Carrie] could ever become a beneficiary would be if Steve
had died during the term of the trust and there were [sic] no divorce
pending.”153 Although Howard’s statement reflected his clear intent at the
time of trial to prevent Carrie from sharing in Stephen’s interest in the
trust, that intent may not have been a trust purpose at the time of
conveyance.154 Howard must have realized that, as of Stephen’s fifty-fifth
birthday, Carrie was effectively a creditor of Stephen, so in hindsight it was
a mistake to have required a mandatory distribution without asset
protection features preventing creditors from reaching the trust property.155
The trial court found Howard credible and, under the applicable standard
of review, factual findings, including determinations about witness
credibility, are reversed only if clearly erroneous.156 Here, the appellate
court’s opinion contains language implying that it did not believe
Howard’s trial testimony because he may have changed his mind about the
trust’s purposes after the irrevocable conveyance.157 Thus, had the
applicable standard of review not required deference to the trial court’s
factual findings, the appellate court most likely would have found that the
settlor’s testimony reflected a reconsideration of the trust’s objectives
rather than the settlors’ original intent at the time of conveyance.
Under a broader reading of the case, In re Chapman offers insight into
the relevant inquiry regarding the settlor’s intent. It suggests that only the
settlor’s original intent should be applied to determine whether the trust’s
terms should be modified in light of unanticipated circumstances.
Equitable deviation authorizes a court to modify the trust’s terms but does
not permit reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent, whether by the
court or the settlor himself. Opponents of trust term extension may cite In
152. See id. at 583 (interpreting the terms of the trust in order to conclude that the settlor
anticipated the possibility of a pending dissolution of marriage at the time of the beneficiary’s
death).
153. Id. at 576 (alterations in original).
154. Contrary to Howard’s characterization, Carrie did not assert a beneficial interest in the
trust. Rather, she claimed that trust property distributed to Stephen on his fifty-fifth birthday would
become marital property for purposes of the divorce proceeding after its distribution from the trust.
Id.
155. Some asset protection features, such as spendthrift protection, would not have prevented a
former spouse from reaching the beneficiary’s interest in the trust. See infra Subection IV.B.1.
156. In re Chapman, 953 N.E.2d at 578–79 (citing Tew v. Tew, 924 N.E.2d 1262, 1264–65
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).
157. Id. at 582 (“[B]y their very nature, irrevocable trusts carry risks that relationships and
values and circumstances may change after the date the Trust is funded, and those risks must be
evaluated against the tax and other benefits received by the settlor(s).”).
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re Chapman for the proposition that the settlor’s probable intent must
relate back to the time of conveyance and that courts should not authorize
modification where the settlor might have chosen a different trust purpose,
even in light of unanticipated circumstances.
IV. THE LARGER CONTEXT: PERPETUITIES AND TRUST LAW REFORM
This Part considers the issue of trust term extension within the larger
context of legal reform affecting dead hand control of property. In recent
years, trust law and the legal regime governing wealth transfers have been
pulled in opposing directions. Perpetuities reform, in the form of
widespread repeal and abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, has
moved in the direction of strengthening dead hand control while reforms in
the broader law of trusts have staged a measured retreat away from dead
hand control. This policy schism can be explained, at least partly, by the
divergent views of stakeholders lobbying for reform. Academic legal
scholars and members of the American Law Institute are, by and large,
disinterested stakeholders with no financial stake in the outcome of legal
reform. They tend to argue against perpetual dead hand control because
inflexible restrictions lead to disagreement when circumstances inevitably
change with the passage of time and concentrations of wealth often
associated with dead hand control exacerbate wealth and income
inequality.158 The financial services industry, with a strong pecuniary interest
in perpetuities reform, tends to favor expansion of dead hand control because
the increased use of trusts, both in quantity and duration, generates a
corresponding increase in revenues obtained from establishment and
administration of those trusts.159 This Part will place the issue of trust term
extension within the framework of these diverging trends of legal reform.
158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27
reporter’s note, at 564–66 (2011) (noting that the American Law Institute’s position is that the
recent statutory trend of abrogating the Rule is “ill advised” and that “[a]n important reason for
maintaining a reasonable limit on dead-hand control is that the limit forces control of encumbered
property to be shifted periodically to the living, free of restrictions imposed by the original
transferor”); see also Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem
of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006) (arguing that perpetual trusts, if successful,
“will probably exacerbate class divisions between the wealthy and the rest of Americans”); cf.
Shepard, supra note 1, at 561 (discussing various arguments for and against the Rule Against
Perpetuities); Tate, supra note 7, at 597 n.9 (noting that “law professors tend to regard issues of
dead-hand control as important”).
159. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2098, 2101–03 (2003) (describing
competition among states to attract banks and trust companies through abolishment of the Rule
Against Perpetuities); cf. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1335 (2003) (“There is an old saw in the banking business: ‘How do you
make a small fortune? Give a bank a large one to manage in trust.’”).
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A. Perpetuities Reform: The Rise of Dead Hand Control
Over the last few decades, reform in the law governing private
perpetual trusts has facilitated the rise of dead hand control by dramatically
scaling back limitations imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.160 The
vast majority of American jurisdictions had at one point adopted the
Rule—or some form of limitation on perpetual restrictions on property—
but a recent wave of state law reform has effected a broad reversal of
policy such that today, most states permit the exercise of dead hand control
for hundreds of years or in perpetuity through “dynasty trusts” as they are
known within the bar.161 This reform was driven, for the most part, by the
desire of state legislatures to attract out-of-state trust business and the
perceived economic benefits associated with locating the trustee’s situs
within the state’s jurisdiction.162 In a groundbreaking and influential
160. See Harding, supra note 15, at 297–98.
161. See id. at 295–97; MADOFF, supra note 22, at 76–82. A recent fifty-state survey by the
American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel summarizes the status of perpetuities reform:
A majority of states have eliminated the rule against perpetuities, either
entirely or for certain types of trusts, or have adopted a very long fixed permissible
period of the rule.
Louisiana has never had the rule against perpetuities. Instead, trust terms are
strictly limited by statute, to reflect the Civil Law background of Louisiana law.
Eight states have repealed the rule against perpetuities. These states are
Alaska (repealed the rule for vesting of property interests), Delaware (repealed
entirely for personal property interest held in trust; 110 year rule for real property
held directly in trust), Idaho, Kentucky (repealing the rule interests in real or
personal property), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota.
Nine states have adopted longer fixed periods for the rule against perpetuities,
sometimes only for certain types of property. These states are Alabama (100 years
for property not in trust; 360 years for property in trust), Arizona (500 years),
Colorado (1,000 years), Delaware (110 years for real property held in trust);
Florida (360 years), Nevada (365 years), Tennessee (360 years), Utah (1,000
years), Washington (150 years).
Seventeen states have retained the rule against perpetuities, but allowed
certain trusts to continue without application of the rule. These states are Arizona,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wyoming.
The Rule Against Perpetuities: A Survey of State (and D.C.) Law, ACTEC, at 7–8
http://www.actec.org/public/documents/studies/zaritsky_rap_survey_03_2012.pdf (last updated
Mar. 2012); see generally JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2012 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
tbl.9 (2011) (providing a detailed state-by-state analysis of critical questions associated with the
Rule).
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27
intro. note, at 564 (2011) (“The movement to abrogate the Rule Against Perpetuities has not been
based on the merits of removing the Rule’s curb on excessive dead-hand control. The policy issues
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empirical study, Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach
concluded that repeal or abrogation of the Rule did, in fact, attract trustrelated business in states without an income tax on trust assets: “[T]hrough
2003, roughly $100 billion in trust funds have poured into the states that
have validated perpetual trusts,” alongside up to $1 billion in annual
commissions charged by trustees.163
Donors found the Rule’s repeal attractive for at least two reasons, one
more potent than the other. First, perpetuities reform allowed donors to
indulge in aspirations for immortality and posthumous influence by
exercising enduring control over gratuitous transfers of property.164
Second, and more importantly, federal tax reform in 1986 created a
significant tax advantage for trusts spanning multiple generations: a large
and perpetual exemption amount under the federal GST tax.165
The perpetual GST tax exemption arose from Congress’s attempt to
close a loophole in the federal estate tax.166 The estate tax is imposed on
transfers taking effect at death and applies to property included in the
decedent’s gross estate.167 The value of the gross estate includes “the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the
time of his death.”168 A life estate held by the decedent is not included in
the gross estate because it terminates upon the life estate holder’s death
and, therefore, is not a property interest owned or transferrable by the
decedent at death.169 Prior to 1986, a settlor could minimize estate taxes by
creating successive life estates and, so long as the conveyance complied
with the Rule Against Perpetuities, the conveyance would be taxed only
associated with allowing perpetual or near-perpetual trusts have not been seriously discussed in the
state legislatures. The driving force has been the effort to compete for trust industry (financial
services) business from other states.”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or
Taxes?: Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2474 (2006) (“The
legislative history and contemporaneous local media coverage of these repeals indicate that their
purpose was to preserve competitiveness in the jurisdictional competition for so-called dynasty trust
funds . . . .”).
163. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 26, at 410–11.
164. See Tate, supra note 7, at 619 (noting that “some settlors may have truly dynastic
intentions” and may be “interested in the long-term continuity of their family ‘dynasty’”).
165. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2467.
166. See id. at 2477 (“The 1986 GST tax closed the successive-life-estates loophole by levying
a tax equal to the highest rate of the estate tax on any generation-skipping transfer.”).
167. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2012).
168. Id. § 2033.
169. See Estate of Johnson v. Comm’r, 718 F.2d 1303, 1316 n.48 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Life estates
and other such interests which terminate at death are not reached [by the gross estate].”); John A.
Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, The Fundamentals of Wealth Transfer Tax Planning: 2011 and Beyond,
47 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 393 (2011) (“[I]nterests that are terminable at the decedent’s death, such as
life interests measured by the decedent’s life or contingent remainders that terminate at death, are
not included under § 2033.”).
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once rather than at each successive generation.170 In 1986, Congress closed
the loophole by enacting the GST tax, which imposed the maximum
federal estate tax rate “with respect to any generation-skipping transfer.”171
A transfer skips a generation when it passes to “a natural person assigned
to a generation which is 2 or more generations below the generation
assignment of the transferor” or a trust held by such persons.172 The GST
tax, however, provides an exemption amount equal to the estate tax
exemption, which, as of 2014, allows every individual to transfer a
cumulative amount of $5.34 million during life and at death free of federal
transfer taxes.173 Married couples may elect split treatment of a transfer
from either spouse to a third party, such that each spouse is treated as
having given half, which, in effect, doubles the exemption amount to
$10.68 million.174 The GST tax exemption, therefore, allows a settlor to
create a perpetual trust (in states permitting such trusts) that will likely
remain free of federal transfer tax liability forever.
Empirical analysis of data collected by federal agencies regulating the
financial services industry compared trust holdings before and after
enactment of the GST tax; the study produced “[c]onsiderable evidence
support[ing] the view that the GST tax sparked demand for perpetual trusts
by giving trust duration greater salience in estate planning.”175 Thus, for
wealthy individuals, state-level repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities and
the sizable GST tax exemption proved to be powerful complements—
dynasty trust legislation enabled enduring control over private property
while federal transfer tax reform rendered it financially advantageous to
exercise that control.176
In 2011, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved an official position
opposing the modern trend toward allowing perpetual and long-term

170. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2476–77.
171. I.R.C. § 2641(a); see text accompanying supra note 165.
172. I.R.C. § 2613(a).
173. Id. §§ 2631, 2010(c).
174. Id. § 2652(a)(2).
175. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2478; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro. note, at 568 (2011) (“The political
pressure on the states to remove the limit entirely or to extend the limit to several centuries would
not have arisen were it not for the artificial incentive created by the GST exemption. In fashioning
the GST exemption, Congress did not intend to encourage states to modify or repeal state perpetuity
law to facilitate perpetual or near-perpetual trusts. On the contrary: Congress displayed a lack of
foresight in relying on state perpetuity law to limit the length of GST-exempt trusts. An unintended
consequence of tax law should not determine policy on so fundamental a matter as state perpetuity
law, especially since history suggests that tax loopholes do not last indefinitely.”).
176. For a searing and colorful critique of the trend toward allowing perpetual dead hand
control, see generally MADOFF, supra note 22, at 76–85.
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trusts.177 Noting that limitations on perpetuities are deeply rooted in
American legal tradition, the ALI’s statement asserted that trusts of
limitless duration could yield millions of beneficiaries and “[n]o transferor
has enough wisdom to make sound dispositions of property across such
vast intervals and for beneficiaries so remote and so numerous.”178 State
legislatures, however, have yet to heed the ALI’s warning. No jurisdiction
that abrogated or repealed the Rule has reinstated limitations on
perpetuities since the ALI’s pronouncement.179
Trust term extension, as contemplated in the example provided in the
Introduction, represents a logical extension of the national trend toward
repeal and abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in at least three
respects. First, dynasty trust legislation reinforces the settlor’s prerogative
to dictate the future use of gifted property and unequivocally favors
expanding dead hand control over the rights of beneficiaries.180 The
rationale for trust term extension would rest on similar principles—
authorizing the impairment of existing beneficial interests for the sake of
carrying out a broader vision of the settlor’s intent. Second, many states
abrogated the Rule Against Perpetuities to attract trust business to their
jurisdictions,181 and because trust term extension would help those states
retain that business with regard to pre-repeal trusts that would otherwise
terminate naturally, trust term extension is therefore in line with those
states policy objectives and the Rule’s repeal. By extending the duration of
such trusts in perpetuity, states would enjoy the perpetual benefits
associated with locating the trustee’s situs within their jurisdiction. It is
also possible that the same financial institutions that lobbied to repeal the
Rule may also seek to persuade state legislatures to broaden the retroactive
applicability of the Rule’s repeal. Third, in states that permit retroactive
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 intro.
note, at 564 (“It is the considered judgment of The American Law Institute that the recent statutory
movement allowing the creation of perpetual or near-perpetual trusts is ill advised. The movement
to abrogate the Rule Against Perpetuities has not been based on the merits of removing the Rule’s
curb on excessive dead-hand control. The policy issues associated with allowing perpetual or nearperpetual trusts have not been seriously discussed in the state legislatures. The driving force has
been the effort to compete for trust industry (financial services) business from other states.”).
178. Id.
179. Professor Lawrence Waggoner recently proposed another method of curtailing the
proliferation of perpetual trusts: end the GST tax exemption for them. See Waggoner, supra note
11, at 2–3, 14–15 (arguing that Congress facilitated the perpetual-trust movement through the GST
tax advantage, and “[b]ecause Congress has not yet acted to rectify its mistake, the perpetual-trust
movement is in full bloom”).
180. See Tate, supra note 7, at 596 (“These statutes have given rise to a new American legal
entity: the perpetual dynasty trust, a trust that has the potential to last forever, or for hundreds of
years . . . . The perpetual dynasty trust gives unprecedented freedom to the settlor, who can now
extend a dead hand far into the future.”).
181. See id. at 603; Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 162, at 2474–75.
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application of the Rule’s repeal, trust term extension would treat settlors
who created trusts pre-repeal the same as settlors who created trusts postrepeal.
Trust term extension, however, would appear inconsistent with
legislative intent in jurisdictions prohibiting retroactive application of the
Rule’s repeal. Many states do limit or prohibit retroactive application182
and such limitations demonstrate the legislature’s implied unwillingness to
impair existing beneficial interests for the purpose of expanding dead hand
control. Courts should therefore construe statutory limits on retroactivity to
preclude the use of estate planning techniques, such as trust decanting, to
bypass the legislature’s intent only to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities
prospectively.
States should more carefully consider the costs associated with trust
term extension. Unlike the prospective authorization of perpetual trusts,
retroactive authorization of such instruments would harm incumbent
beneficiaries by impairing the value of their interests. Since financial
institutions are the driving force behind efforts to authorize perpetual
trusts, the question is not limited to whether dead hand control should
override the interests of living beneficiaries. The more relevant inquiry
may be whether the financial institutions that profit from administering
perpetual trusts should be given modification powers not contemplated by
the settlor at the cost of impairing the interests of the settlor’s handpicked
beneficiaries. At bottom, trusts exist to benefit beneficiaries, not the
corporate fiduciaries paid to administer them.
B. Trust Law Reform: A Modest Retreat from Dead Hand Control
A contrasting modern trend in trust law embodies features that tend to
weaken the settlor’s ability to exercise perpetual control over property held
in trust. This is particularly true of reforms envisioned by national law
reform organizations such as the ALI and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, responsible for publishing the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code, respectively.
Noting this trend, Professor Thomas Gallanis183 has argued persuasively
that “American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in
a new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the
beneficiaries.”184 This new direction of trust law tends to erode dead hand
control by strengthening the interests and rights of trust beneficiaries in at
182. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 161, at tbl.9.
183. Professor Gallanis is the executive director of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust
and Estate Acts and he served as Associate Reporter for the Restatement Third of Trusts. Thomas P.
Gallanis, U. IOWA C. L., http://www.law.uiowa.edu/faculty/thomas-gallanis.php (last visited Sept. 9,
2014).
184. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 216.
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least four respects: (1) narrowing the scope of spendthrift protection; (2)
lowering the standard for trustee removal; (3) relaxing the “material
purpose” standard for early trust termination; and (4) permitting
administrative deviation without regard to the settlor’s intent.
These reforms, however, have taken place within a regime that remains
guided by the principle of honoring the settlor’s intent.185 The settlor is the
trust’s primary principal and, as such, holds inherent powers to set the ex
ante constraints governing the beneficiary’s use and enjoyment of trust
property.186 With regard to the new direction of trust law, state legislatures
have been slow to embrace the most aggressive reform efforts to contain
dead hand control, and recent case law reflects continued judicial fidelity
to settlor intent when beneficiaries seek to upset the settlor’s reasons for
creating the trust. Thus, while the trust law reform envisioned by the ALI
and the Uniform Law Commissioners has moved in the direction of
weakening dead hand control, adoption of the most progressive reform
measures by state legislatures and courts has moved at a slower pace.
1. Spendthrift Protection
A spendthrift provision allows the settlor to protect interests in trust
from anticipation by the beneficiary and, in turn, from attachment by the
beneficiary’s creditors.187 A spendthrift provision disables the beneficiary
from transferring her trust interest to third parties; also, because the
protection precludes the beneficiary from alienating her interest, the
beneficiary’s creditors are likewise precluded from asserting claims against
it.188 Under Broadway National Bank v. Adams,189 spendthrift protection
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1, at
276 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is
the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by
law.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2010) (noting that recent reforms governing trust
modification and termination were drafted with deference to the “principle that preserving the
settlor’s intent is paramount”).
186. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
683–84 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory] (arguing that the normative claim that
trust law should minimize agency costs should be qualified by “the ex ante instructions of settlor”
because such qualification “gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s
primary principal”).
187. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. d, at 360 (2003) (“Spendthrift
protection prevents anticipation of the beneficiary’s rights but does not extend beyond the point of
distribution.”); id. § 58, at 355 (providing generally that “if the terms of a trust provide that a
beneficial interest shall not be transferable by the beneficiary or subject to claims of the
beneficiary’s creditors, the restraint on voluntary and involuntary alienation of the interest is
valid”).
188. See id. § 58 cmt. a, at 355 (“The term ‘spendthrift trust’ refers to a trust that restrains
voluntary and involuntary alienation of all or any of the beneficiaries’ interests.”); id. ch. 12, intro.
note, at 348 (“The rules stated in this Chapter deal with the validity and effect of trust provisions
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derives from the settlor’s right as “absolute owner of his property” to
dispose of property with any restriction or limitation not contrary to public
policy.190 Although spendthrift protection may, in some cases, benefit the
beneficiary, its justification resides in the settlor’s prerogative to determine
the nature and extent of the beneficiary’s interest in donated property.
Highlighting the rule’s deference to the settlor, Professor Gallanis
observed: “The rule of Broadway National Bank permitted settlors to use
spendthrift clauses to strip beneficiaries of the power of voluntary and
involuntary alienation of their interests in trust.”191 Although controversial
at their inception more than a century ago, spendthrift trusts have come to
be recognized as valid by all fifty states.192
The modern trend toward codification of trust law ushered in a wave of
spendthrift statutes,193 many containing exceptions to and limitations on
spendthrift protection.194 The Uniform Trust Code, for example, provides
that a “spendthrift provision is unenforceable against . . . a beneficiary’s
child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or court order against
the beneficiary for support or maintenance.”195 California and New York
enacted statutory exceptions allowing creditors to reach trust income in
excess of amounts necessary for the beneficiary’s support and education.196
California also enacted an exception to the enforcement of spendthrift
protection where “the beneficiary owes restitution to crime victims due to

imposing forfeiture for voluntary or involuntary alienation of beneficiaries’ interests (§ 57) and
spendthrift provisions that disable beneficiaries from transferring their interests and their creditors
from reaching those interests (§§ 58 and 59).”).
189. 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
190. Id. at 173.
191. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222.
192. Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685
n.2 (2006); N. Camille Varner, Note, Is the Dead Hand Losing Its Grip in Texas?: Spendthrift
Trusts and In re Townley Bypass Unified Credit Trust, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 598, 609 n.89 (2010)
(listing state statutory provisions).
193. For a survey of states adopting the spendthrift provisions of the Uniform Trust Code, see
Barry A. Nelson, Summary of States that Adopted the Uniform Trust Code and Those States’
Treatment of Exception Creditors, ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/
Nelson_UTC_State_Laws_03_21_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
194. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 221–22 (“By legislation, a number of states have imposed
limitations on the effectiveness of spendthrift clauses, thereby providing some ability for the
beneficiary to alienate, and creditors to reach, the beneficiary’s interest in the trust.” (footnote
omitted)).
195. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b)(1) (2010). Eighteen of the twenty-four states that have
adopted the Uniform Trust Code have adopted this exception in one form or another. See Nelson,
supra note 193.
196. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15306.5(b), 15307 (West 2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 7-3.4 (McKinney 2014); see Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222.
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the beneficiary’s criminal conduct.”197 Taken together, the modern rules
governing spendthrift trusts now recognize “more circumstances in which
the beneficiaries must have the obligations of ownership,” including the
obligation to allow some unpaid creditors to reach the beneficiary’s interest
in the trust.198 By subjecting the beneficiary’s trust interest to certain
personal liabilities, newly codified exceptions to the spendthrift rule tend
to erode the dead hand’s power to insulate trust assets from obligations
incurred by living recipients.199
197. Ventura Cnty. Dep’t of Child Support Servs. v. Brown, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 489, 495 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 15305.5).
198. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 222–23; Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law
for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191, 230 (2005). Note, however, that some courts
have limited the proliferation of exceptions to spendthrift protection under the guise of honoring
settlor intent. For example, courts have deferred to the principle of settlor intent in rejecting
common law exceptions for tort creditors seeking to attach a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift
trust. See, e.g., Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416, 422 (Md. 2003) (“The creditors of the beneficiary
have no right to complain, because the founder of the trust did not give his bounty to them.”);
Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 413 (N.H. 2011) (noting that although the “defendant will likely
remain incarcerated for a period of years . . . the trust’s purpose ‘may still be fulfilled while the
defendant is incarcerated’” (citation omitted)). But see Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cnty.,
704 So. 2d 1020, 1029 (Miss. 1997) (“We find, as a matter of public policy, that a beneficiary’s
interest in spendthrift trust assets is not immune from attachment to satisfy the claims of the
beneficiary’s intentional or gross negligence tort creditors, and that such claims take priority over
any remainder interest in such assets.”). The Uniform Trust Code contains no exception for tort
creditors and the majority rule is against creating a public policy exception for tort creditors.
HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224 (2013).
199. See Laurene M. Brooks, Comment, A Tort-Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift Trust
Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 109, 114–15 (1989) (arguing that
notwithstanding the historical absolute validation of spendthrift provisions, the modern trend “has
been to ignore the settlor’s intent and carve out public policy exceptions to the spendthrift trust
doctrine”). Pulling in the opposite direction, however, recent legislation authorizing self-settled
spendthrift trusts—protection of trust assets from the settlor’s own creditors while allowing the
settlor to maintain a beneficial interest in the trust—represents an expansion of settlor control.
Thirteen states have enacted legislation authorizing self-settled spendthrift trusts, discarding the
traditional rule prohibiting the settlor from using a spendthrift provision to insulate his own assets
from his own creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1996)
(noting traditional public policy prohibitions on self-settled spendthrift trusts, which amount, “in
essence, to a declaration that one wishes to own one’s assets free of the claims of one’s judgment
creditors—that is, free of liability”). For a survey of states authorizing domestic asset protection
trusts, see generally David G. Shaftel, Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes,
ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-DomesticAsset-Protection-Trust-Statutes-Updated-through-April-2014.pdf (last updated Apr. 2014) (charting
state domestic asset protection trust statutes). While authorization of self-settled spendthrift trusts
would seem to represent a great expansion of settlor power, “[i]t remains to be seen whether the
courts of states that adhere to the traditional rule will respect domestic [self-settled asset protection
trusts].” Sitkoff & Schanzenbach supra note 26, at 384. Recent case law has shown that, where
settlors have used the device to defraud creditors, courts have responded by setting aside the trust
conveyances as fraudulent transfers. Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 816 (Bankr.
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Trust term extension is inconsistent with the modern trend of
spendthrift law because it would divest incumbent beneficiaries of both the
benefits and obligations of ownership. Statutory exceptions to spendthrift
protection reflect a policy decision to override the settlor’s intent to protect
trust assets in order to satisfy certain legal obligations of the beneficiary.200
By contrast, trust term extension would allow the settlor’s intent to
override the interests of both incumbent beneficiaries and statutorilyprotected creditors of incumbent beneficiaries such as child and spousal
support judgment holders. For example, a trust might be modified in a way
that impairs the interests of incumbent residuary beneficiaries to create
new interests for unborn generations of the settlor’s descendants. If it were
so modified, that alteration would also impair the rights of creditors of the
incumbent residuary beneficiaries by limiting recovery to an income
interest rather than the original residuary interest conveyed by the settlor.
Unborn descendants of the settlor would have no current creditors, so the
net effect of trust term extension would be to deprive current creditors of
the statutory protections against enforcement of a spendthrift provision.
2. Trustee Removal
Trustee removal implicates the extent of dead hand control because the
issue often arises in cases of disagreement between the beneficiary and
trustee regarding the settlor’s instructions. Such is the case where the
beneficiary asks the trustee to override terms imposed by the settlor, the
trustee refuses, and the beneficiary seeks the trustee’s removal.201 Under
the common law of trusts, a court could remove a trustee only for cause,
generally in serious cases of incompetence or misconduct.202 Friction or
W.D. Wash. 2013) (invalidating self-settled spendthrift trust on fraudulent transfer grounds);
Battley v. Mortensen (In re Mortensen), No. 09-00565, 2011 WL 5025249, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ala.
May 26, 2011) (same). While authorization of self-settled spendthrift trusts represents an expansion
of settlor control, it does not reflect an expansion of dead hand control. The most potent benefits of
self-settled spendthrift trusts accrue to settlors during their lifetimes and have less to do with
protecting the interests of beneficiaries. Thus, on balance, these instruments do not significantly
alter the tension between settlors and beneficiaries.
200. Brooks, supra note 199, at 114–15.
201. Cf. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 736 (treating trustee removal in the context
of modification and termination and noting that under modern law, trustee removal “is more freely
granted, effectively as a modification of the trust, sometimes in circumstances that reveal a tension
between the intent of the settlor and the wishes of the beneficiary”).
202. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts enumerates a nonexhaustive list of grounds for trustee
removal:
[L]ack of capacity to administer the trust . . . ; the commission of a serious breach
of trust; refusal to give a bond, if a bond is required; refusal to account; the
commission of a crime, particularly one involving dishonesty; unfitness, whether
due to old age, habitual drunkenness, want of ability or other cause; permanent or
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disagreement between the trustee and beneficiary, standing alone, was not
grounds for trustee removal.203 The common law’s high standard for
removal tended to strengthen dead hand control by preventing beneficiaries
from installing, at will, a new trustee with less fidelity to the settlor’s
instructions.204 On the other hand, the high standard for removal tended to
insulate the trustee from external scrutiny and increase the risk of
negligence or poor trustee performance.205 The common law standard
helped preserve the settlor’s influence over the trust, but did so at the cost
of enabling subpar trustee conduct that adversely affected the
beneficiaries.206
Recent reform has modestly expanded the grounds for trustee removal
while retaining deference to the settlor’s purpose and selection of the
trustee.207 The Uniform Trust Code reverses the common law rule by
long-continued absence from the State; the showing of favoritism to one or more
beneficiaries; unreasonable or corrupt failure to co-operate with his co-trustees.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. b, at 235–36 (1959).
203. Id. cmt. c, at 236 (“Mere friction between the trustee and the beneficiary is not a sufficient
ground for removing the trustee unless such friction interferes with the proper administration of the
trust.”).
204. See Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the
Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of
Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 242 (2002) (“Because changing trustees . . . can be seen as a
type of trust modification, courts have been hesitant to permit it.”); Gayle B. Wilhelm, Changing
Horses: Some Thoughts About Removal of Trustees, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 273, 274 (2005)
(“The [removal for cause rule is] based upon the premise that if the grantor had intended that the
beneficiaries have the right to remove the trustee without cause, the grantor would have included in
the governing instrument any one or more of the many common forms of removal clauses. After all,
the grantor may argue as follows: ‘It is my money, my trust, and it is my right to determine who is
to carry out my intent. If I wanted my beneficiaries to be able to remove my Trustee, I would have
given them that power.’”). As Professor Sitkoff observes, “an important consideration for settlors
when choosing a trustee is the trustee’s expected fidelity to the wishes of the settlor in the future
exercise of discretion.” Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 663.
205. See generally Chester & Ziomek, supra note 204 (discussing the response of the Uniform
Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts to complaints of beneficiaries “regarding the
difficulties in removing a corporate trustee”).
206. Cf. id. at 250 (“[I]n continuing to hold the settlor’s intent paramount . . . American courts
and lawmakers are tying the hands of the beneficiaries, whose interests the settlor was originally
concerned with promoting. To say that a settlor, by naming in his trust a particular bank as trustee,
intended a special relationship with that trustee, may result in unintended dead hand control
disadvantaging the beneficiaries.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
207. Professor Sitkoff explains the tradeoff:
The difficulty, then, is setting the threshold for trustee removal high enough so
that the trustee can carry out the settlor’s wishes (including the protection of future
beneficiaries) in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current beneficiaries
without setting it so high as in effect to sanction shirking or mismanagement.
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authorizing at will removal of a trustee where “removal is requested by all
of the qualified beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of the trustee
best serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent
with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee or successor
trustee is available.”208 Recent case law shows that beneficiaries have
successfully sought “no fault” removal where a newly proposed corporate
trustee offered to charge lower administrative fees and to provide better
service to the beneficiaries than the incumbent corporate trustee.209 In such
cases, the risk of undermining the settlor’s intent is minimal because the
purpose of removal is to improve the trust’s administration rather than
override restrictions imposed by the settlor.210
The new rules governing trustee removal give incumbent beneficiaries
leverage against a trustee seeking to extend the duration of a trust at the
cost of impairing existing beneficial interests. Under the new removal by
consent standard, an objecting incumbent beneficiary would be able to seek
removal of the trustee without proving incompetence or other breach of
trust.211 A case may arise where the trustee was successful in obtaining
modification over the beneficiaries’ objection (as explained above,
equitable deviation does not require the beneficiaries’ consent) or without
the beneficiaries’ participation in the proceeding. In such a case, incumbent
beneficiaries could seek the trustee’s removal, post-modification, without
Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 663–64.
208. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4) (2010). The Restatement (Third) of Trusts, however, does
not authorize at will trustee removal upon consent of the beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 37 (2003) (“A trustee may be removed (a) in accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b)
for cause by a proper court.” (emphasis added)).
209. See, e.g., In re McKinney, 67 A.3d 824, 833–34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (allowing the
replacement of an existing beneficiary where the new beneficiary will, inter alia, “allow for more
efficient administration of the assets”); Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425, 430–31
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
210. See McKinney, 67 A.3d at 836 (noting that in the absence of evidence suggesting that a
settlor contemplated a specific trustee, “the only material purpose that can be served through
designating a trustee is that the trustee effectively administers the trusts” (emphasis added)). On the
other hand, trustee removal is more likely to undermine the settlor’s intent when a beneficiary seeks
removal of the incumbent trustee and proposes herself as the successor trustee. For example, in
Rapela v. Green (In re Kampros), 289 P.3d 428 (Utah 2012), the Utah Supreme Court explained as
follows:
[W]hen considering removal, courts must give effect to the beneficial interests
identified in the trust and intended by the trustor, not to the beneficiaries’
subjective desires. We therefore reject [the beneficiary’s] contention that the
district court owed deference to her desire to remove [the trustee] when it
evaluated the beneficiaries’ best interests.
Id. at 433.
211. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b).
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appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of unborn, remote,
or contingent beneficiaries under the Uniform Trust Code’s qualified
beneficiary concept.212 Once the trustee is removed and replaced,
beneficiaries could petition the court to undo the modification.
3. Early Trust Termination
If given the option, many beneficiaries would probably prefer to acquire
possession of their beneficial interest outright, free of trust. As a general
rule, however, American trust law has historically protected the settlor’s
interest in continuing the trust by setting a high standard for early trust
termination. Under the common law Claflin doctrine, a beneficiary could
not obtain early termination if a material trust purpose remained to be
accomplished; this was true even if all beneficiaries consented to
termination.213 Courts construed this standard broadly, finding a material
purpose in spendthrift provisions and terms reposing discretion in the
trustee to distribute income or principal.214 The Claflin doctrine facilitated
dead hand control by readily inferring the existence of material trust
purposes that could not be accomplished fully until the trust’s natural
termination. As Professor Gallanis observed: “Since virtually all modern
trusts contain discretionary provisions, and most modern trusts contain a
boilerplate spendthrift clause, the number of trusts in the modern age that
can be terminated early has been very low.”215
But the Claflin doctrine’s stringent standard is now on the decline as
recent reform efforts have strengthened the right of beneficiaries to obtain
212. Under the modern rule, a trustee may be removed without cause by consent of all
qualified beneficiaries, defined as follows:
[A] beneficiary who, on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined: (A)
is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; (B) would
be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the
interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on that date
without causing the trust to terminate; or (C) would be a distributee or permissible
distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date.
Id. § 103(13), at 11.
213. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 455 (Mass. 1889); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 337(2) (1959) (“If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the
trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.”); Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note
186, at 659.
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 reporter’s notes, at 547–49 (1959) (listing
cases where beneficiaries could not terminate a trust if termination would defeat the settlor’s
purpose in creating the trust); Sitkoff, Agency Cost Theory, supra note 186, at 659 (“[C]ourts have
had little difficulty finding a ‘material purpose’ that would be offended by a modification or
termination.”).
215. Gallanis, supra note 17, at 228.
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early trust termination.216 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts lowers the
standard for trust termination with the beneficiaries’ consent in two
respects. First, the Restatement provides that spendthrift protection and the
repose of discretion in the trustee should not be presumptively treated as
implying a material purpose:
If the interests of one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust
are subject to restraints on alienation, or if the terms of the
trust provide support or other discretionary benefits for some
or all of the beneficiaries, this may supply some indication
that the settlor had a material purpose—a protective
purpose—that would be inconsistent with allowing the
beneficiaries to terminate the trust. Nevertheless, spendthrift
restrictions are not sufficient in and of themselves to
establish, or to create a presumption of, a material purpose
that would prevent termination by consent of all of the
beneficiaries. This is also true, in many contexts, of
discretionary provisions.217
This standard forces the trustee to establish the settlor’s reasons for
continuing the trust with far greater specificity than under the Claflin
doctrine, which in effect imposed a presumption against early termination.
And second, the Restatement allows beneficiaries to compel early
termination after the settlor’s death where the court finds that the reasons
for termination outweigh the trust’s material purpose.218 This position
marks a stark reversal of the Claflin doctrine by allowing beneficiaries to
override the settlor’s objectives and redefine the trust’s material purpose
with the court’s approval.
Like the Restatement, the Uniform Trust Code expresses caution in
inferring the existence of a material purpose,219 but is otherwise less
permissive of early trust termination. Unlike the Restatement, the Uniform
Trust Code does not permit early termination by consent of the
beneficiaries where the reasons for termination outweigh the material trust
216. Tate, supra note 7, at 607.
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e, at 479 (2003).
218. Id. § 65(2), at 473.
219. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (2010) (‘“Material purposes are not readily to be inferred.
A finding of such a purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective on
the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a beneficiary’s management skills, judgment,
or level of maturity. Thus, a court may look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating
that the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating the benefits of
property among multiple [intended] beneficiaries, or a means of offering to the beneficiaries (but
not imposing on them) a particular advantage. Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a
trust suggests its protective nature or some other material purpose.”’ (quoting the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d, at 477 (2003)).
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purpose.220 As initially drafted, the Uniform Trust Code provided that a
spendthrift clause “is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the
trust,” but after several states declined to adopt the provision, the language
was placed in brackets and rendered optional.221
Taken together, the new direction of trust law reform at the national
level reflects efforts to impose greater limitations on dead hand control by
lowering the material purpose standard and, in the Restatement’s case, by
allowing beneficiaries to override a material trust purpose upon
demonstrating a good reason for early termination. What remains to be
seen, however, is whether state legislatures and courts will follow the lead
of law reformers. The Restatement’s balancing test has not been widely
adopted,222 and no reported judicial decision has granted early termination
of a private trust at the request of consenting beneficiaries where
termination was inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust and the
reasons for termination outweighed the material purpose.223 Early
indications suggest that the shift toward permitting early termination will
be gradual.224 Some courts have continued to apply the presumption that
220. Id. § 411(b), at 70–71 (“A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be modified upon consent
of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust.”); see also Tate, supra note 7, at 607 (“The Third Restatement, but not the
UTC, allows a court to modify or terminate a trust even when doing so would contravene a material
purpose of the settlor, provided that the court determines that the reasons advanced by the
beneficiaries in favor of modification or termination outweigh the material purpose.” (emphasis
added)).
221. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(c) cmt.
222. Cf. Tate, supra note 7, at 607 n.74 (providing that the Restatement’s balancing test “is
absent in the UTC, possibly because it has little chance of being adopted by state legislatures, which
are reluctant to thwart the settlor’s intent”). California may have been the first jurisdiction to
anticipate the Claflin doctrine’s decline. It enacted a standard permitting termination where the
reasons outweigh the trust’s material purpose in 1990, long before the Restatement (Third) of
Trust’s promulgation of the standard in 2003. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 79 (West) (codified at CAL.
PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (West 2014) (“If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or terminated unless the court, in its
discretion, determines that the reason for doing so under the circumstances outweighs the interest in
accomplishing a material purpose of the trust.”).
223. However, in Boys & Girls Club of Petaluma v. Walsh, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 416, 423
(Dist. Ct. App. 2008), the court found that the reasons for termination of a charitable trust
outweighed any material purpose in continuing the trust.
224. For example, in Vaughn v. Huntington National Bank, Trust Division, No.
2008AP030023, 2009 WL 342697 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009), the trust provided beneficiaries
with monthly income of $250; the beneficiaries sought early termination of the trust and outright
distribution of the remaining $50,000 in the trust corpus. Id. at *1–2. The court acknowledged the
Uniform Trust Code comment cautioning against readily inferring material purposes but denied
early termination because it found that an implied material trust purpose was to ensure that the
beneficiaries “receive a secure monthly income as long as the corpus of the trust remains.” Id. at
*4–5 (affirming denial of early termination where beneficiaries consented to outright distribution of
corpus, but the settlor intended to provide a stream of income akin to an annuity).
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spendthrift protection constitutes a material trust purpose225 while other
courts have rejected it.226 Thus, the Claflin doctrine is on the decline but
not yet obsolete.
The notion of extending a trust beyond its natural termination and the
perpetuities period in effect at the time of conveyance represents a marked
inconsistency with the modern trend’s retreat from the Claflin doctrine.
Trust term extension would strengthen dead hand control by expanding the
settlor’s stated objectives at the cost of impairing existing beneficial
interests. The Restatement’s position on trust termination, however, allows
beneficiaries to override the settlor’s material purpose, thereby shifting
control away from the settlor’s dead hand. In jurisdictions that no longer
readily infer a material purpose from spendthrift provisions or the repose of
discretion for purposes of trust termination, it would be inconsistent to
infer from the same provisions evidence of the settlor’s intent to continue
the trust indefinitely. Trust term extension is therefore inconsistent with the
Claflin doctrine’s decline and the increased ability of beneficiaries to
terminate a trust by consent.
4. Administrative Deviation
Under the doctrine of administrative deviation, courts have the power to
modify an administrative provision of a trust if circumstances
unanticipated by the settlor threaten to adversely affect operation of the
trust.227 Older formulations of the doctrine required inquiry into the
settlor’s intent,228 but the Uniform Trust Code authorizes modification of
an administrative provision (though not a distributive one) where
“continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or
wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.”229 The new standard for
administrative deviation does not require deference to the settlor’s intent.
The comment to § 412 of the Uniform Trust Code explains that the
essential purpose of a trust is to serve and benefit the beneficiaries, not

225. See, e.g., Buckalew v. Arvest Trust Co., N.A., 425 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Ark. Ct. App.
2013); Weitzel v. First Citizens Trust Co. (In re Trust Under Last Will & Testament of Weitzel),
No. 09-0447, 2009 WL 4842807, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009).
226. In re Pike Family Trusts, 38 A.3d 329, 331–32 (Me. 2012) (“Prior to 2005, we
recognized a common law presumption that a spendthrift clause, simply by virtue of its presence,
was a material purpose of the trust . . . . By enactment of the Maine Uniform Trust Code, effective
in 2005, the Legislature eliminated this presumption.”).
227. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 536–39 (5th ed. 2011).
228. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 223–25 (explaining that “[c]onsistent with the Restatement
(Second), the role of the settlor figures prominently in a leading case on administrative deviation” ).
229. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b) (2010).
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impose upon others an obligation to carry out unreasonable restrictions.230
Opining on the doctrine’s lack of deference to settlor intent, Professor
Gallanis concluded that:
the doctrine of administrative deviation shows how the new
direction of American trust law is to rebalance the wishes of
the settlor with the ownership rights of the beneficiaries. The
administration of the trust must, in the end, be for the benefit
of the beneficiaries, and their equitable ownership over the
trust assets must be respected.231
Thus, the Uniform Trust Code’s formulation of administrative deviation
does not bear directly on the issue of trust term extension because it does
not apply to modification of a distributive provision. Its underlying
rationale supports a retreat from the principle of dead hand control,
however, by affirming that the essential purpose of a trust is to serve and
benefit the beneficiaries. Trust term extension, by contrast, would impair
the interests of existing beneficiaries for the purpose of expanding rather
than implementing the settlor’s stated intent.
C. Recommendation for Law Reform
It is highly likely that the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code,
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers did not contemplate the possibility of trust
term extension in the context presented in this Article. Had they considered
the issue, they most likely would have drafted language precluding the
practice for many of the reasons discussed herein. This Article therefore
recommends that the Uniform Trust Code be revised to clarify that
modification doctrines—including equitable deviation and modification to
achieve the settlor’s tax objectives—do not permit the addition of
beneficiaries not identified in the original trust instrument. Prohibiting the
addition of new beneficiaries would resolve the question of whether a trust
could be extended in perpetuity because the duration would be limited to
the lifespan of the beneficiaries identified by the settlor.
CONCLUSION
Widespread repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities has prompted
creative estate planning practitioners to contemplate whether an
230. Id. § 412 cmt. at 77 (“Although the settlor is granted considerable latitude in defining the
purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have a purpose which is for the benefit of its
beneficiaries precludes unreasonable restrictions on the use of trust property. An owner’s freedom
to be capricious about the use of the owner’s own property ends when the property is impressed
with a trust for the benefit of others.”).
231. See Gallanis, supra note 17, at 226.
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irrevocable trust settled pre-repeal could be transformed into a perpetual
trust post-repeal. For example, where there is evidence that the settlor
wanted to create a perpetual trust to benefit several generations of unborn
descendants but chose not to because of the perpetuities period in effect at
the time of conveyance, a trustee might argue that, had the settlor
anticipated the Rule’s repeal, he would have created a perpetual trust. The
trustee would further argue that, under the doctrine of equitable deviation,
courts have the power to modify a trust to effectuate the settlor’s intent
notwithstanding objections of existing beneficiaries. By allowing a trust
with identifiable residuary beneficiaries to be transformed into a trust of
perpetual (or near-perpetual) duration, equitable deviation would arguably
allow all settlors to be treated equally without regard to whether the trust
was created before or after the Rule’s repeal.
This Article articulates four reasons why resorting to equitable
deviation in this manner would represent a misapplication of the doctrine.
First, courts generally do not apply equitable deviation where the proposed
modification would impair existing beneficial interests. Trust term
extension would impair existing beneficial interests because, to create a
perpetual trust, incumbent residuary beneficiaries would be forced to
accept a less valuable lifetime interest in the trust. Second, equitable
deviation exists to implement the settlor’s intent as it existed at the time of
conveyance by modifying terms of the original instrument in light of
unanticipated circumstances; by contrast, trust term extension would not
only modify the original instrument’s terms but would also allow for
reconsideration of the settlor’s original intent. Third, extending the
duration of an existing trust into perpetuity would undermine the trust law
requirement of an ascertainable beneficiary. And fourth, application of
equitable deviation in this context would present an unnecessary risk of
misinterpreting the settlor’s intent under circumstances where the trust
could be administered according to its original terms without frustrating
the original trust’s purpose.
Within the larger context of reform movements affecting the law of
perpetuities and the broader law of trusts, the idea of trust term extension
implicates complex questions about the permissible extent of donor control
and the purpose of donative trusts. On one hand, some states have repealed
the Rule Against Perpetuities retroactively, implying a legislative intent to
permit the conversion of pre-repeal trusts into post-repeal perpetual trusts.
In states prohibiting retroactive application of the repeal, however, it would
follow that pre-repeal trusts should not be modified or decanted in a way
that would violate the perpetuities period in effect at the time of
conveyance. On the other hand, legal reform in the broader law of trusts
has marked a modest retreat away from dead hand control in at least four
respects relevant to trust term extension: spendthrift protection, trustee
removal, trust termination, and administrative deviation.
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On balance, the idea of extending a trust beyond the perpetuities period
in effect at the time of conveyance and creating new beneficial interests for
unborn descendants of the settlor should be an exercise of creative thinking
rather than creative estate planning. Trust term extension of this sort is
inconsistent with modern trends in the broader law of trusts; also, to the
extent that states have authorized retroactive application of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, there is no evidence suggesting that legislatures
foresaw the use of modification doctrines like equitable deviation to impair
existing beneficial interests. The new direction of trust law increasingly
recognizes the rights of beneficiaries, particularly when those rights stand
in conflict with restrictions imposed by the settlor’s dead hand. Trust term
extension, under the illustration presented in this Article, would unfairly
resurrect the dead hand and allow it to impair the interests of incumbent
beneficiaries for the sake of conferring benefits upon individuals selected
by the trustee rather than settlor. Worse yet, although proponents of trust
term extension may purport to represent the interests of the settlor’s dead
hand, in many cases, such proponents may in fact be financial institutions
furthering their own pecuniary interests in administering perpetual trusts.
With regard to law reform, the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code might
consider a revision clarifying that modification doctrines do not permit the
addition of new beneficiaries not identified in the original trust instrument.
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